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I. INTRODUCTION
RIVATE equity financing offers a potential source of capital to the
Mexican entrepreneur who has insufficient access to conventional
sources of capital to finance his business operations. Many entre-
preneurs, however, do not fully understand private equity financing or
the process for obtaining it.' This article is intended to help the entrepre-
neur and his advisors gain such knowledge in order to facilitate the flow
of private equity investment into his company.2
1. See Judith Evans, The Search for the Perfect Gift Horse, LATnN FIN., May 1998, at
23.
2. The term "company" in this context refers to either (i) Mexican early-stage (de-
fined in note 4 below) and later stage companies (defined in note 5 below), or (ii)
U.S. or "offshore" holding companies that the entrepreneur forms to own his Mex-
ican company.
PRIVATE EQUITY IN MEXICO
This article is divided into four sections. Section I provides entrepre-
neurs with a basic understanding of the fundamentals of private equity
financing (i.e., what is it? What is the general process for obtaining it?
What basic financial instruments are used to secure it? What are the ma-
jor risks to those who provide it?). Section II focuses on key issues within
the life of a private equity investment that entrepreneurs should consider.
Section III discusses whether an entrepreneur should form a U. S. hold-
ing company to own his Mexican company to better attract private equity
financing. Section IV offers some concluding thoughts about obtaining
private equity in Mexico.
A. WHAT IS PRIVATE EQUITY FINANCING?
Private equity3 financing generally refers to investments that profes-
sional investors make in early stage 4 and later stage 5 companies with a
high risk profile. 6 The expectation by the professional investor is that
such investments will yield high rates of return. From the entrepreneur's
perspective, private equity offers financing to companies that no longer
may rely solely on financing from themselves, their "friends and family,"
7
3. Some observers consider "private equity" to include only later stage investments
and "venture capital" to involve investments in early stage companies. As used
here, private equity includes investments in both early and later stage companies
and venture capital is the early stage segment of private equity. See Morrison &
Foerster LLP, The Need for Legal and Regulatory Reforms in Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, El Salvador and Mxico to Promote Risk Capital Investments in Small and
Medium Size Enterprises, at http://www.mofo.com/news/index.cfm (Feb. 2001). See
also Roger Leeds & Julie Sunderland, Private Equity in Emerging Markets: Re-
thinking the Approach, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. (forthcoming 2003), available at
http://www.sais-jhu.edu/bizgovcenter/articlesPEinEmergingMarkets.html. See
CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR'S GUIDE TO
BUSINESS LAW 104 (1998).
4. As used here, "early stage" generally refers to businesses that may or may not
have a complete management team, an operating history, developed a business
plan, completed beta testing, demonstrated the initial viability of their business
concept, or generated any revenues. See Robert M. Kossick, Jr. & Julian Fernan-
dez Neckelmann, Structuring Private Equity Transactions in M~xico, 6 NAFTA L.
& Bus. REV. AM. 105, n.36 (2000).
5. As used here, "later stage" generally refers to the following types of businesses:
1) small and medium size firms that have an established product or market, a
history of growth, an experienced management team, positive earnings and
cash flow, and that need money to expand the firm's operations, develop new
products, or acquire a related business; and
2) private or public companies that are in financial distress (such as businesses
that are over-burdened with debt).
See Kossick & Neckelmann, supra note 4, at 110-11, n.20. See Leeds & Sunder-
land, supra note 3, at 2-3. See Christopher J. Mailander, Searching for Liquidity:
United States Exit Strategies for International Private Equity Investment, 13 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 71, 72-73 (1997).
6. See section I.D. for a description of the major economic, legal, and political risks
that investors face in making private equity investments in Mexico.
7. Although friends and family make private equity investments (generally in ex-
change for common stock or debt convertible into common stock), many observers
do not consider "friends and family financing" to be private equity because their
investment decisions are motivated by their relationship to the entrepreneur in
addition to any potential returns. See Morrison & Foerster, supra note 3, at n.2.
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or their suppliers and customers s to fuel their growth, but that because of
their risk profile, cannot raise capital through conventional channels, such
as borrowing from banks or issuing public securities. Private equity fills
this gap between self-financing and conventional capital market activity
by offering entrepreneurs an attractive mid-point along the financing
spectrum.9
In exchange for investing in high risk companies (many of which fail), a
private equity fund expects financial returns that exceed conventional in-
vestments, often 25 percent or higher, compounded annually. 10 To
achieve such returns, investors look for a company that has the potential
to grow quickly and significantly."' Before investing, investors often un-
dertake a rigorous and intrusive due diligence investigation"2 of the com-
pany's managers and operations. Once they invest, investors generally
take an active role in the management of the business,1 3 claim a priority
8. In some businesses, entrepreneurs may be able to generate capital by carefully
managing cash flow. For example, a business may be able to obtain advance pay-
ments or deposits for its products and services or obtain payment within fifteen
days of shipment instead of the more customary thirty or forty-five days. Simi-
larly, a business may be able to postpone making payments to suppliers until sixty
or ninety days after shipment is received. Last, a company may lease equipment
instead of purchasing it to conserve cash. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3,
at 105-06.
9. See Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 3. at 1, 3. See Kossick & Neckelmann, supra
note 4, at 110-12. See Victoria Griffith, Private Venture; Venture Capital in Latin
America, LATIN FIN. (June 1996), at 22. See Evans, supra note 1, at 26.
10. See Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 3, at 2-3. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note
3, at 105, 190. See Kossick & Neckelmann, supra note 4, at 110. See GEORGE W.
FENN ET AL., BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. Sys., THE ECONOMICS OF
THE PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET, 168 STAFF STUDY 17 (1995), available at http://arti
cles.corporate.findlaw.com/articles/00030/008513.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2002).
See Lorenzo Weisman, The Advent of Private Equity in Latin America, 31 COLUM.
J. WORLD Bus. 36, 41 (1996).
11. Venture capitalists, in particular, seek investments that, at a minimum, satisfy the
following characteristics: (i) new technology, marketing concepts, market opportu-
nity, product applications, or other elements that provide the potential for ex-
traordinary success; (ii) products or processes that, as a result of innovation, patent
protection, trade secrecy, or "first mover" advantage, allow for the creation of a
market niche or head-start on the competition; (iii) management with outstanding
competence and integrity; (iv) investments that have a reasonable exit or liquidity
strategy within a few years; and (v) situations that permit the investors to make a
contribution to the success of the business beyond the capital invested. See Rei-
naldo Pascual, Venture Capital in Latin America, CORP. FIN. (Issuing Securities
Supp.), Sept. 2000, at III-VI.
12. See section II.A.1 infra for a description of some of the important issues that an
investor typically reviews in its due diligence investigation of the entrepreneur's
business.
13. In contrast, "angel investors" (such as wealthy individuals or funds that specialize
in start-up and early stage companies) often are interested more in a return on
their investment than in taking an active role in the management of the company.
That is, angel investors may or may not insist on board representation or the right
to approve or select key employees. They usually require no more than the right
to veto major changes in the business, such as increases in top management's com-
pensation and the amount of stock available under the company's stock option
plan. Angel investors generally do not demand as much equity as a venture capi-
talist, so dilution of the entrepreneur's ownership interest in the company is mini-
mal. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 102-03. See Mayer, Brown & Platt,
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interest in its assets, and control key actions that the enterprise may
take. 14 Target companies for private equity include businesses that are
too new to have a convincing track record. Also, those early stage and
later stage companies that need expansion capital 15 or those not yet ex-
posed to the capital markets are candidates for private equity finance.
Finally, financially distressed companies that are over-burdened with debt
or those with opaque financial reporting standards that discourage inves-
tors or those perceived as undervalued may access private equity financ-
ing as a vehicle for growth.16
Funds typically raise their capital from institutional investors. These
institutional investors may be public and corporate pension funds, en-
dowments and foundations, bank holding companies, insurance compa-
nies, investment banks, multilateral financial institutions, national
development banks (e.g., Mexico's Nacional Financiera, S.N.C.), govern-
ment organizations, wealthy individuals and families, other corporations,
and investors' groups (fund investors). 17 Fund investors expect a fund to
deliver to the fund investors at least a 20 percent compounded return on
their investment in the fund within the agreed duration of the fund, which
is usually seven to ten years.18 Given that a fund sometimes does not
make an investment in a portfolio company until its second year or later,
the fund seeks to exit from (i.e., sell its investment in) the company
within three to five years after the date of such investment. The goal is to
return the proceeds from such sale to the fund investors within the life of
the fund. 19 If an entrepreneur is looking for a longer time horizon - a
Structuring and Financing a Latin American Internet Start-Up 6 (2000), available at
http://www.mayerbrownrowe.com.
14. See infra notes 191 and 200 for a list of corporate actions that investors often want
to approve before the company takes such actions. See Morrison & Foerster,
supra note 3, at 1; see Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 3, at 3; see Mailander, supra
note 5, at 73; see FENN ET AL., supra note 10, at 43.
15. "Expansion capital" refers to financing needed to expand the firm's plant and
equipment, develop new products or services, acquire a strategic or related busi-
ness, or realize a change in ownership or capital structure through a management
buy-out, leveraged buy-out, or sale to a third party. See Kossick & Neckelmann,
supra note 4, at 110.
16. See Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 3, at 2-3; see Kossick & Neckelmann, supra
note 4, at 110-11; see Mailander, supra note 5, at 73.
17. See FENN ET AL., supra note 10, at 49; see Mailander, supra note 5, at 73; see Kos-
sick & Neckelmann, supra note 4, at 121-22; see Josh Lerner & Gonzalo Pacanins,
Private Equity in Developing Countries, at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu (last visited
May 21, 2003).
18. See Morrison & Foerster, supra note 3, at 10, see Kossick & Neckelmann, supra
note 4, at 121; see Griffith, supra note 9, at 22; see BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note
3, at 105.
19. See Morrison & Foerster, supra note 3, at 10; see BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note
3, at 105, 191. See Paul Kilby, Heading for the Exits, LATIN FIN., May 1, 1999, at
31. But see also Kossick & Neckelmann, supra note 4, at Ill (while the exact
duration of a private equity investment varies in relation to the developmental
stage, condition, and objective of the company, the term of investment typically
ranges from two to ten years, with many investments clustering between three and
seven years).
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factor that should be discussed with the fund managers - the enterprise
may not be suitable for private equity financing.
The roots of private equity in Mexico are found in the Mexican govern-
ment's use of the Sociedad de Inversion de Capital de Riesgo (venture
capital societies or "SINCAS") to promote investment in specified re-
gions of Mexico and certain entrepreneurial activities. SINCAS are still
the principal private equity investment vehicles in Mexico, yet have few
funds available for, and even fewer funds invested in, local companies. 20
This situation is partially explained by the lack of support and incentives
for private equity investment. There is also the absence of a well devel-
oped private equity industry because players and intermediaries are
scarce, and technical support, both private and state sponsored, is virtu-
ally nonexistent. 2 1 Further, individual investors typically are adverse to
risk and often lean towards real estate and other type of sectors that have
demonstrated their resiliency throughout several economic crises. 22
Pension funds are another source of private equity capital in Mexico.
These funds consist of the retirement administration funds (Adminis-
tradoras de Fondos para el Retiro, hereinafter AFORES) and investment
companies specialized in retirements funds (sociedades de inversi6n es-
pecializadas en fondos para el retiro, hereinafter SIEFORES). AFORES
directly manage SIEFORES with a view to obtain "an adequate return in
the investments at the lowest risk possible. ' 23 By definition, SIEFORES
have to implement a low risk investment policy, inconsistent with the
characteristics of private equity investment. That is, all investments made
by SIEFORES must bear a risk qualification of "D" or higher, with a
further requirement of committing a large proportion of the available
funds in instruments bearing a risk qualification of "B" or higher.24 In
addition, SIEFORES by law are not allowed to acquire instruments that
may be converted into private company shares, which is a common in-
vestment vehicle in private equity. Given the low risk investment guide-
lines that SIEFORES must follow and specific prohibitions on investing
in convertible instruments, Mexican pension funds, probably the most rel-
evant institutional investor in the country, are largely unable to provide
20. Motivational chapter of the Resolution amending sections 9 and 15 of the Regula-
tions for the Investment of Technical Reserves of Institutions and Mutual Insur-
ance Companies (Exposicion de Motivos al Acuerdo por el que se Modifican la
Novena y Decima Quinta de las Reglas para la Inversion de las Reservas Tecnicas
de Instituciones y Sociedades Mutualistas de Seguros), Federation's Official Ga-
zette, Aug. 18, 2000.
21. Motivational chapter of the Resolution amending sections 16 and 24 of the Regu-
lations for the Minimum Guaranty Capital of Insurance Companies (Exposicion de
Motivos al Acuerdo por el que se Modifican la Decima Sexta y Vigesima Cuarta de
las Reglas para el Capital Minimo de Garantia de las Instituciones de Seguros),
Federation's Official Gazette, Dec. 30, 1999.
22. See James Petras, Saqueo y Pobreza en Latinoamerica, ALAI, Apr. 15, 1998, at 1,
available at http://alainet.org/docs/81.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2003).
23. See Law for the Retirement Saving System (Ley de los Sistemas de Ahorro para el
Retiro), art. 18.
24. For risk classifications, see the qualifications used by Moody's, Fitch Mexico, or
Standard & Poor's.
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resources to foster the Mexican private equity industry. Pressure, how-
ever, has been growing to reform the current law to allow pension funds
to diversify their investments. Such pressure has initially resulted in an
August 2001 amendment to the Rules for the Minimum Guaranty Capi-
tal of Insurance Institutions (Reglas para el Capital Minimo de Garantia
de las Instituciones de Seguros),25 which allows insurance institutions to
invest part of their reserves in private equity funds, SINCAS, as well as
trusts designed to increase investment in domestic companies. To be
eligible for such investments, these private equity funds and trusts must
obtain authorization from the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit
(Secretarfa de Hacienda y Cr~dito Ptiblico). This authorization is subject
to the following requirements:
(i) The private equity fund and/or trust may only invest in entities in-
corporated in Mexico and with permanent residence in Mexico,
and
(ii) The funds and trust investment portfolio must be diversified, and
investments in a single company or a group of related companies
may not exceed 20 percent of the total portfolio. In addition, the
insurance institutions are limited in the amount of funds that they
can invest in certain types of entities.
B. WHAT IS THE GENERAL PROCESS FOR OBTAINING
PRIVATE EoUITY?
If an entrepreneur wishes to obtain private equity financing, the gen-
eral process that an entrepreneur follows to obtain such financing is set
forth below. Section II contains a more specific discussion of key issues
that entrepreneurs should consider within this process.
1. Business Plan
Generally, the first step to obtaining private equity financing is to pre-
pare a business plan that demonstrates that the entrepreneur knows his
business and has formulated a viable plan for making money from this
business. An effective business plan briefly26 describes the entrepre-
neur's business, products and market, the qualifications of manage-
ment,2 7 the company's competitors and any obstacles that prevent
competitors from entering its market (such as patents), the risks in invest-
25. The Rules for the Minimum Guaranty Capital of Insurance Institutions (Reglas
para el Capital Minimo de Garantia de las Instituciones de Seguros) were repealed
and new rules came into effect as of February 10, 2003; however, the provisions
introduced by the August 2001 reform were maintained in the new Rules.
26. A business plan should be succinct. Investors have little tolerance for reading
more than a fifteen or twenty page business plan. See DAVID GLADSTONE, VEN-
TURE CAPITAL HANDBOOK, 26-30 (1988); see BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at
194-95.
27. Investors often say that the three most important factors in making an investment
are "people, people, and people." The right team can fix a flawed business con-
cept, but a flawed team cannot get a brilliant concept to market. Any weaknesses
in the entrepreneur's team (e.g., the team has no experienced managers, lacks a
2003]
326 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 9
ing in the company, the venture's financial history and goals, the amount
of money needed to attain these goals, how the company will spend this
money and how it intends to return this capital to the fund.28 In short,
the business plan should describe all of the important information that a
well informed investor should know about the company. Investors gener-
ally are busy people, so most want to quickly review a one to three page
summary of the business plan to determine whether they are interested in
reviewing the full business plan and pursuing further discussions with the
entrepreneur. The International Finance Corporation / World Bank
Group offers an "SME Toolkit" at www.ifc.org/sme/html/smecommun
ity.html to provide online resources to small and medium enterprises to
develop their businesses, including a format for building business plans.
2. Legal Advisors
The entrepreneur should retain a law firm that specializes in represent-
ing investors and entrepreneurs in private equity transactions. Such a
firm can assist greatly the entrepreneur in editing his business plan and
building a corporate structure that is attractive to investors. Such a spe-
cialized firm also can be helpful in introducing the company to investors
who would be the most interested in investing,29 negotiating the terms of
the financing and the related documents, and generally ensuring that the
financing process runs smoothly.
3. Finding Private Equity
In seeking private equity investors, entrepreneurs should first deter-
mine what they want from the investor. Is only funding desired, or are
other services necessary, such as financial, management, and/or market-
ing advice, helping to raise capital, identifying and attracting key employ-
ees to the company, or developing business for the company?
Once this determination is made, a good way to find private equity
money is to contact the Latin American Venture Capital Association
(www.lavca.com), the National Venture Capital Association (www.nvca.
com), the European Venture Capital Association (www.evca.com), and
other trade associations comprised of investors who provide private eq-
uity investments to entrepreneurs. Another effective way to find such
financing is to arrange an introduction by someone who knows the inves-
tor, such as friends who have obtained financing and lawyers, account-
ants, or bankers who provide services to funds, companies, or fund
strong chief financial officer, and the like), should be acknowledged in the business
plan. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 194.
28. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 110, 194; see GLADSTONE, supra note 26,
at 26-30.
29. Most private equity investors specialize in certain industries (e.g., software, health
care, electronics, etc.) and/or in a particular stage of development (e.g., seed, early
stage, later stage, mezzanine, etc.), so it is important to target the right type of
investors. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 193.
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investors.3 1 Many companies obtain financing by attending venture fairs
where they make presentations to an audience of investors. Less effec-
tive ways to obtain financing include sending unsolicited business plans to
funds that an entrepreneur finds online or through various published
guides. The problem with this route is that investors receive dozens of
these plans each week and rarely read such plans thoroughly, if at all.31
Finding investors who are willing to make private equity investments is
an arduous task, but finding funds that provide such financing to Mexican
entities is especially challenging since such funds are relatively scarce and
typically are located outside of Mexico. As described in section II below,
however, some entrepreneurs may improve their chances of attracting
such financing by forming a U.S. holding company to own their Mexican
operations because this structure offers investors the best of both worlds:
the advantages of operating in Mexico (e.g., cost savings) and the flexibil-
ity and protection of U.S. corporate laws, enforcement of U.S. courts, and
access to more exit opportunities (e.g., U.S. capital markets).
4. Due Diligence Review
Once an investor has reviewed the full business plan and decides to
pursue further discussions with the entrepreneur, the investor will per-
form a due diligence investigation, the process through which investors
(and their legal and financial advisers) examine a company's business,
products, markets, financial health, and legal situation and conduct back-
ground checks on the management team.32 While the fund is investigat-
ing the company, the entrepreneur should also conduct a due diligence
review on the fund. Section II.A.1 below describes the due diligence pro-
cess in greater detail and the types of materials that investors and entre-
preneurs typically review during their respective due diligence
investigations.
5. Term Sheet
After the investor has completed its due diligence examination and has
indicated a serious interest in making an investment in the company, the
investor (or his attorney) typically prepares a term sheet to outline the
principal terms of the investment, including the investor's valuation of the
company. 33 After the entrepreneur and his attorney have reviewed and
discussed the term sheet, 34 the investor and entrepreneur negotiate its
terms. If other investors have invested previously in the company, they
30. See id. at 192.
31. See id, at 191-92.
32. See id. at 196.
33. Section II infra discusses valuation and other principal terms that a term sheet
typically contains. The valuation of the company determines the price that the
investor pays for stock in the company.
34. The entrepreneur's attorneys should review the term sheet before the entrepre-
neur signs it to ensure that the entrepreneur understands the ramifications of each
term and protects the company's interests.
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usually will join these negotiations, which commonly complicate discus-
sions. The pressure of these negotiations offers a great opportunity for
the parties to evaluate their ability to work together. If the chemistry
between the parties is not good, often it is a mistake to make and accept
the investment, particularly where cultural and language differences are
likely to accentuate such bad chemistry. Section II.A.2 below examines
key provisions in the term sheet that the entrepreneur should consider
especially carefully.
6. Investment
When the parties have negotiated and signed the term sheet, the inves-
tor's attorney normally prepares the financing documents, which set forth
all of the parties' rights and obligations with respect to the investment.
The entrepreneur's attorney then reviews the financing documents to en-
sure that they reflect the terms of the term sheet and the parties' agree-
ment. Even if the financing documents accurately reflect the term sheet,
the parties also typically negotiate the terms of the financing documents
because the term sheet only outlines the general terms of the investment
whereas the financing documents detail the specific rights and obligations
of the parties, many of which raise issues that the parties must resolve
prior to the investment. Once the parties have completed and signed the
financing documents, the investor makes the investment. Sometimes the
fund makes its investment in several "tranches" (partial payments), each
upon the occurrence of a certain milestone or other event.
7. Management
To achieve the high financial returns that a fund expects from the com-
pany, the investor normally takes an active role in the management of the
business. This management role often includes sitting on the company's
board of directors, retaining a veto right over important actions that the
company may take, requiring the company to provide the investor with
certain financial and other information on a periodic (e.g., monthly or
quarterly) basis and generally providing managerial and marketing advice
to the company. Many entrepreneurs, however, especially older family-
owned firms, are skeptical about the benefits of shared management and
resist sharing power and business information with an outsider. 35 If an
entrepreneur cannot share power and information with the investor, a
factor that often becomes obvious during initial negotiations between the
parties, the enterprise may not be suitable for private equity. Thus, it is
important for all parties to negotiate clear and effective mechanisms to
regulate the relationship among all stockholders, especially the terms and
conditions dealing with governance, financial decisions, day-to-day man-
agement, dispute resolution, and the investor's exit from its investment in
the company.
35. See Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 3, at 7, 10.
PRIVATE EQUITY IN MEXICO
8. Exit
As mentioned above, investors seek to sell their investment in the com-
pany within three to five years after the date of investment in order to
return the sale proceeds to the fund investors within the life of the fund.
An investor generally expects to sell his investment in the company in
one of the following ways: (i) to the general public through a public sale
of the company's stock (public sale), (ii) in a private sale to a third party
who buys the company's stock or assets (private sale to third party), 36 (iii)
in a private sale to another stockholder who buys the investor's stock
(private sale to stockholder), or (iv) in a private sale to the company itself
who repurchases ( or "redeems") the investor's stock (redemption or pri-
vate sale to issuer). 37 As discussed in section II below, an investor's exit
from an investment in a Mexican company is limited because (i) a re-
demption generally is illegal in Mexico, (ii) a public sale through Mexican
public markets normally is not available for a small or mid-sized Mexican
company,38 (iii) the pool of buyers willing to purchase the stock or assets
of a Mexican company in a private sale to third party is relatively small in
Mexico, and (iv) other stockholders often are unwilling or unable to
purchase the investors' equity in a private sale to stockholder. Section III
below discusses how an entrepreneur may increase his exit opportunities
(and thus his chances of attracting private equity investment) by forming
a U.S. holding company.
C. WHAT ARE THE BASIC FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS USED TO
PROVIDE PRIVATE EQUITY?
In obtaining private equity financing, the entrepreneur must decide
whether to raise this capital in the form of equity (such as preferred
stock) or debt. In simple terms, the equity of a company is the value that
someone is willing to pay for it minus any liability attached to it (for ex-
ample, its fair market value minus its debt). 39 Although the term "private
equity" suggests that companies only issue equity instruments (such as
stock) and not debt instruments (such as promissory notes), in practice,
companies commonly issue both equity and debt instruments to investors
36. Potential purchasers include competitors, strategic investors and later-stage inves-
tors. Id. at 9.
37. See Morrison & Foerster, supra note 3, at 10; Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 3, at
8-9; Mailander, supra note 5, at 73; Kilby, supra note 19, at 32-34; Griffith, supra
note 9, at 23; Kossick & Neckelmann, supra note 4, at 111-16, 144-48; John Bar-
ham, Venture Capital's Dark Cloud, LATIN FIN., Oct. 2001, 30, 31, 34; Mark Piper,
Waiting for a Way Out, LATIN FIN., Nov. 2000, 40, 41; Mayer, Brown & Platt, supra
note 13, at 11; Jorge E. Alers et al., Strategizing Your Exit from Private Equity
Investments in Latin America, presentation at the Institute on Small Medium En-
terprise Financing sponsored by the Multilateral Investment Fund, Nov. 8-12,
1999, at 9-16.
38. See Kossick & Neckelmann, supra note 4, at 114, 166; Barham, supra note 37, at
31-33; Kilby, supra note 19, at 32-34; Pascual, supra note 11, at IV.
39. For example, property having a fair market value of $20,000 with debt of $15,000
has equity of $5,000 ($20,000 minus $15,000 equals $5,000).
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in return for private equity financing. Below is a brief description of the
basic equity and debt instruments issued in private equity financing.
1. Equity Instruments
Once the entrepreneur and investor determine the valuation of the eq-
uity in the company, the entrepreneur can then sell parts of the equity in
order to raise capital. The company sells equity to investors in the form
of stock or as rights to acquire stock (such as stock options, warrants, and
convertible debt).
From the company's perspective, one of the benefits of selling equity to
raise money is that the company generally does not have to return the
money to the fund unless the company has paid all of its debts and has
money remaining to return to its stockholders. In addition, the interests
of an investor holding stock are more aligned with the interests of the
other stockholders in the company since none of them make money un-
less the company builds equity. Thus, such investors will have a greater
incentive to use their experience and contacts to open doors for the com-
pany and help the company grow as quickly as possible.
One disadvantage of selling equity is that the company allows the fund
to become a co-owner of the company, thereby diluting (or decreasing)
the existing stockholders' ownership interest in the company. As the
company grows, the company often will be under pressure from existing
stockholders to limit the degree of dilution resulting from additional eq-
uity financing. Also, there are usually tax factors40 and other business
implications that affect whether the company obtains debt or equity
financing.
Below is a brief description of the basic instruments that a company
can use to sell equity to investors.
a. Common Stock
Common stock generally is the ordinary stock of the company and
gives the holder the right to participate in the company's profits after the
company has paid all of its debts to creditors and its obligations to the
preferred stockholders. 4 ' That is, common stock typically is the last to
share in the equity of the company. A company typically issues common
shares to the entrepreneur and his employees, friends, and family who
have invested in the company.
b. Preferred Stock
To protect their investment, investors commonly obtain preferred stock
from the company, which gives them rights in addition to those given to
40. From a tax standpoint, some corporations can deduct their interest payments.
41. For example, common stockholders typically have the same rights to vote, to re-
ceive dividends, and to receive their pro rata portion of the assets of the company
upon a sale or liquidation. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 116.
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common stockholders. These preferential rights often include liquidation
preferences, dividend rights, redemption rights, conversion rights, anti-
dilution protection, and voting rights (which rights are described in detail
in section II below).
c. Stock Options and Warrants
A stock option and a warrant each give its holder the right to purchase
a certain amount of equity for a specific price at a certain period of time.
A stock option differs from a warrant in that a company generally grants
stock options to its employees and consultants, whereas a warrant typi-
cally is sold to investors and other third parties. 42 A company commonly
issues stock options to employees and consultants as an additional incen-
tive to work for the company, giving them an opportunity to share in any
appreciation in the value of the business without having to invest any of
their own money until a future date. That is, to motivate employees, a
company offers stock options to employees that "vest" over time (e.g.,
monthly or quarterly over a four-year period). An employee can exercise
vested stock options to purchase stock, but cannot exercise unvested
stock options. So, the longer that an employee works for the company,
the more vested stock options the employee earns, which the employee
can exercise to purchase stock in the company at a favorable price.
In contrast, a company often issues warrants as a sweetener or "kicker"
to induce investors to (i) make a bridge loan to the company while the
company raises additional financing or (ii) purchase additional shares of
the company's preferred stock by giving these investors the right to use
these warrants to purchase lower-priced common stock in conjunction
with their purchase of higher-priced preferred stock, thus lowering the
average price that the investor pays for its equity (and thus increasing its
potential return on investment).4 3 An entrepreneur also may issue a war-
rant to third parties to induce them to lease real estate or equipment to
the company or to enter into a business relationship with the company. 44
As discussed in section II below, Mexican law does not allow a company
to issue stock options and warrants.
d. Restricted Stock
Restricted stock is equity that an employee 45 purchases from the com-
pany but which the company can repurchase from the employee if he
leaves the company or is terminated prematurely. In the typical case, the
shares that the employee purchases are subject to a vesting schedule pur-
suant to which the employee's shares will vest over a period of three to
42. Id. at 117, 226.
43. See id. at 117. See MICHAEL J. HALLORAN ET AL., 1 VENTURE CAPITAL AND PUB-
LIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION 13-2 (3d ed. 1983).
44. See HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 6-3.
45. Investors often require entrepreneurs to hold restricted stock so that the entrepre-
neur will have an incentive to continue to work for the company for a period of
time.
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five years.4 6 If the employee leaves or is terminated prematurely before
his stock fully vests, the company can repurchase the unvested portion of
the shares. The purpose of the vesting provisions is to require the em-
ployee to earn his stock by working for the company for a period of
time.4 7 Restricted stock differs from stock options and warrants in that
restricted stock are shares that the employee actually holds but can lose
in certain circumstances whereas stock options and warrants only re-
present a right to purchase stock that the employee can exercise in cer-
tain circumstances. As discussed in section II below, Mexican law
generally does not allow any redemption, thus a private Mexican com-
pany cannot repurchase any unvested restricted stock of an employee
who leaves the company or is terminated prematurely.
2. Debt Instruments
A company that raises capital through debt financing does not sell its
equity, but instead borrows against it. This means that the investor who
holds debt in the company gets paid before the investor who holds stock.
For this reason, investors making high risk private equity investments 48
are more apt to make a debt investment in a company instead of an eq-
uity investment so that if the company fails, the investor holding debt will
get its money back before any stockholder is paid. Thus, the interests of
an investor holding debt are less aligned with the interests of the com-
pany's stockholders since such investor is more focused on getting his
money back and less concerned about the company as a whole. So, inves-
tors holding debt generally will be less inclined to use their experience
and contacts to open doors for the company and grow the company as
quickly as possible.
From the company's perspective, an advantage of selling debt to raise
money is that the investor will not become a co-owner of the company, so
the existing stockholders' ownership interest in the company is not di-
luted. Also, there are usually tax factors4 9 and other business implica-
tions that may prompt a company to obtain debt financing over equity
financing.
Below is a brief description of the basic instruments that a company
can use to sell debt to investors.
a. Convertible Loan
From the investor's perspective, the disadvantage of a debt investment
is that the investor does not have an ownership interest in the company
and thus cannot enjoy any of the upside potential of an equity investment
46. See HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 6-3.
47. See id.
48. An investment in a distressed company, in a developing country where the eco-
nomic, legal, and political risks are high, or during an economic downturn are ex-
amples of high risk investments.
49. From a tax standpoint, some corporations can deduct their interest payments.
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if the company is successful. To remedy this problem, investors some-
times use a convertible note to give them the best of both debt and eq-
uity. In simple terms, a convertible note is debt that the investor can
convert to equity (such as common or preferred stock) upon the occur-
rence of a specific event (e.g., when the company secures a subsequent
round of financing, the company becomes profitable, or reaches some
other milestone). With a convertible note, the investor has the protection
of a debt investment (thus, getting its money from the company first) and
upon conversion the benefits of equity (such as shares in the equity of the
company if it is successful). Of course, other ways that investors can
"equitize" their debt investment are to receive warrants to purchase addi-
tional shares of the company at a favorable price to give themselves an
equity sweetener on a debt investment 50 or any of the debt payments
described below.
Convertible debt might be more advantageous to the company if it car-
ries a lower interest rate than straight debt. Also, when the entrepreneur
and investor are unable to agree on the valuation of the company's equity
(or want to postpone an equity financing), the company often will issue
convertible debt to the investor in the form of a bridge note, which the
investor can convert into common or preferred stock of the company
upon the occurrence of a future event.
b. Miscellaneous Debt Payments
Instead of taking equity in the company, some investors require the
company to pay them a certain percentage or other amount of the reve-
nue or profits that the company receives over a period of time as a service
fee, a commission, royalty payment, or other type of payment. The disad-
vantage of this type of arrangement for the company is that it allows the
investor to share in the company's revenues or profits before any stock-
holder receives any money.
c. Secured vs. Unsecured Loan
Although investors who hold debt are paid before stockholders, some
debt holders want secured debt to ensure that they are paid before other
debt holders. Secured debt is debt that is backed (secured) by a pledge of
collateral. Some investors require that the company pledge some or all of
its assets as collateral to secure payment of their loans. If the company
defaults on a secured loan, the creditor generally has recourse against
either the borrower or the specific property that the borrower pledged as
collateral. If the borrower defaults on an unsecured loan, however, the
creditor only has recourse against the borrower. A convertible loan gen-
erally is unsecured, but can be secured.
50. See HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 6-3; Mayer, Brown & Platt, supra note 13,
at 10.
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D. WHAT RISKS Do INVESTORS FACE IN MAKING PRIVATE EQUITY
INVESTMENTS IN MEXICO?
Investors making private equity investments in Mexico face a variety of
legal, economic and political risks, some of which are outlined below.
1. Economic Risks
Investors making private equity investments in Mexican companies
face a variety of economic risks besides the usual high risks that come
from investing in early stage companies that have unknown management,
a limited operating history, and unproven business concepts and later
stage companies that are financially distressed (such as over-burdened
with debt) or are seeking to expand into new markets. Some of these
additional economic risks are described below.
a. Weak Accounting Standards
Investors often find that Mexico lacks, in practice, standardized ac-
counting principles and that local practices are incompatible with U.S.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (hereinafter U.S. GAAP).5 1
Although Mexico recently has made significant progress to toughen its
accounting standards, the rules set by its own Institute of Public Account-
ants (Instituto Mexicano de Contadores Publicos) are less onerous than
those mandated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board in the
United States. Examples of differences between Mexican and U.S.
GAAP include the statement of cash flow (e.g., Mexican inflation adjust-
ing techniques may differ from those in U.S. GAAP), deferred income
taxes (such as some temporary differences that flow from the way
purchases may be deducted for tax purposes under U.S. and Mexican
GAAP), and employee profit sharing (e.g., the effects of any deferral are
not recorded under Megican GAAP). 52
b. Contingent Liabilities
Investors making private equity investments in Mexican companies
have difficulty quantifying the amount of contingent liabilities (such as
back due taxes, delinquent social security contributions, 53 environmental
clean-up costs, 54and the like) that the company might have prior to mak-
51. See Morrison & Foerster, supra note 3, at 3; Kossick & Neckelmann, supra note 4,
at 132.
52. See Kossick & Neckelmann, supra note 4, at 132.
53. Social security contributions are considered taxes under the Fiscal Code of the
Federation (C6digo Fiscal de la Federaci6n). A company is responsible for regis-
tering its employees and making timely contributions to the Social Security Insti-
tute (Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social) in accordance to the terms of the Social
Security Law (Ley del Seguro Social), art. 15.
54. Under article 1114 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mex-
ico cannot relax its environmental standards to maintain or attract investment. In
addition, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC), a side agreement to NAFTA, establishes a procedure whereby re-
sidents in a NAFTrA country may request the Commission for Environmental Co-
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ing its investment.55 For example, tax audits in Mexico may not be final
determinations, so investors (and the entrepreneur) may not know
whether the company owes taxes until after the investor has made his
investment.56 Moreover, Mexican law provides that a new stockholder in
a Mexican company is liable for all pre-existing obligations of the com-
pany, so the Mexican company arguably cannot indemnify the investor
for the amount of the taxes. 57 Directors also are liable for the failure of
the Mexican company to (i) create and manage systems of accounting,
control, bookkeeping, and filing, (ii) ensure that stockholders have made
their capital contributions to the company, and (iii) pay dividends prop-
erly.58 Of course, the difficulty in gauging a company's liabilities, contin-
gent or otherwise, adversely affects the valuation of the company that the
entrepreneur and investor negotiate, and increases the risk that the in-
vestment will not be profitable.
c. Currency Devaluations
Another key element that funds consider when making investments in
Mexican companies is the currency devaluation risk, which is always inte-
grated into the price of the target company and the expected returns on
the investment. The Mexican peso underwent a series of devaluations
during the 1970s. During most of the 1980s and the early 1990s, the Mex-
ican government set target ranges for the international value of the peso
and entered the currency markets whenever the peso's exchange value
fell out of a predetermined range.59
In 1988, a strategic decision to peg the peso to the dollar was adopted
as a stabilization plan, which was part of a structural reform program that
helped reduce inflation from 159 percent in 1987 to 7 percent in 1994.60
Yet, a classic case of exchange rate overshooting occurred in the wake of
a brutal collapse of confidence in the peso and a massive suspension of
private capital flows. The result: a peso depreciation of over 100 percent,
from 3.5 pesos to 7.3 pesos to the U.S. dollar.61 Since then, the Mexican
monetary policy regarding currency devaluations is to leave the peso sub-
operation (CEC) - an intergovernmental body created by NAAEC itself - to
assess whether a NAFTA country is failing to enforce its environmental laws. As a
result of such proceeding, the CEC may elaborate a factual statement regarding
the alleged omission. This mechanism of citizen participation, however, cannot
result in a binder resolution. See NAAEC, arts. 14, 15.
55. Other contingent liabilities include employee claims, employee pension funding,
uninsured product liability, breached product warranties, and contracts. See Mor-
rison & Foerster, supra note 3, at 3; Kossick & Neckelmann, supra note 4, at 131.
56. See Morrison & Foerster, supra note 3, at 3.
57. Id.
58. See General Law of Business Organizations (Ley General de Sociedades Mercan-
tiles), arts. 158, 160. See Kossick & Neckelmann, supra note 4, at 132.
59. Peter S. Rose, The Impact of the Peso Devaluation on Bankers' Access to Mexico
under NAFTA, University of Texas at Austin, Institute of Latin American Studies,
available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/cswht/paper4.html (last visited May 22, 2003).
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ject to a floating regime. The peso has been stable for the last six or
seven years at an average cost of nine to ten pesos per U.S. dollar. Sev-
eral different institutions forecast the peso will close the year at 10.80
pesos per dollar. 62 The Central Bank categorically insists that a floating
regime will be followed, and that monetary policy will be anchored on
targets for domestic credit expansion.
d. Family-Owned Business
The relationship between the investor and entrepreneurs is complex
and often contentious, even in the best of circumstances. This issue be-
comes more problematic when investing in family-owned firms. One ob-
server has summarized the issues about investing in family-owned firms
as follows:
Although widespread in all countries, family ownership tends to be
even more prevalent in developing countries. The prototype is an
entrepreneur who has built a successful business with virtually no
capital or shareholders beyond his immediate family and close
friends. Absent the necessity of accountability to outside sharehold-
ers, the interests of the owner and the firm are indistinguishable, and
financial accounts are frequently intermingled. These traditions of
autonomy, secrecy and independence run deep within the corporate
culture of most developing country firms, rarely challenged until the
need for outside capital becomes imperative. 63
2. Legal Risks
In addition to economic risks, investors making private equity invest-
ments in Mexican companies find a less flexible corporate law regime,
fewer legal instruments to structure investments, and inadequate enforce-
ability of the available instruments. 64 This increases the risk of making
private equity investments in Mexican companies, thus making investors
less likely to invest in Mexican ventures.
a. Inflexible Investment Structures
Private equity financings require flexible corporate law regimes that
provide for a wide variety of enforceable legal instruments to structure
investments. Due to the codified nature of the Mexican legal regime as a
civil law system, the corporate laws in Mexico, although developed, do
not adequately provide the variety of flexible legal mechanisms or the
enforceability of those available necessary to facilitate private equity in-
vestments. 65 Examples of these limitations are outlined below and de-
scribed in greater detail in section II below.
62. See City, at www.cityeconomika.com (last visited May 23, 2003).
63. See Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 3, at 7.
64. See Morrison & Foerster, supra note 3, at 5.
65. See id.
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(i) No Advance Waiver of Preemptive Rights
Mexican law grants all stockholders of a Mexican company the right to
purchase their pro rata portion of any new stock that the Mexican com-
pany issues. 66 This preemptive right (derecho de preferencia) is designed
to protect minority stockholders from having their ownership percentage
in the company diluted (decreased) by new stock issuances and stock-
holders cannot agree to waive this right prior to such issuance. As dis-
cussed in section II.A.2 below, the inability of stockholders to waive their
preemptive rights in advance (prior to the stock issuance) prevents the
Mexican company from issuing future equity pursuant to stock options,
warrants, anti-dilution rights, registration rights and other mechanisms
commonly used in private equity financings.
(ii) No Stock Options and Warrants
In the United States, stock options, warrants, and similar rights are im-
portant tools that an entrepreneur uses to attract and retain key employ-
ees and consultants67 and to induce investors to invest in his company.
Mexico's current legal framework, however, does not allow a Mexican
company to issue such rights for the reasons set forth in section II.A.2
below.
(iii) No Voting Agreements
Investors making private equity investments typically become minority
stockholders in the target company (meaning they purchase less than 50
percent of the company's stock). To protect themselves against the ac-
tions of the majority of the stockholders, investors often require the en-
trepreneur and other major stockholders in the company to enter into an
agreement to vote in a certain way on key issues affecting their invest-
ment in the company (such as election of directors, drag-along rights, and
the like). As discussed in section II.B below, however, Mexican law zeal-
ously protects the voting rights of all stockholders and thus does not al-
low stockholders to waive their right to vote or agree in advance to vote
in a certain manner. 68 Consequently, investors must find mechanisms
other than voting agreements to protect themselves against majority
stockholders.
(iv) Limited Dividend Rights
Private equity investors typically obtain preferred stock with dividend
rights that require the company to pay a dividend first to the preferred
66. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 132.
67. Stock options have the dual purpose of rewarding the employee by allowing him to
participate in any increase in the value of the company and ensuring that the em-
ployee stays with the company for a certain period of time in order to share such
profits. See Morrison & Foerster, supra note 3, at 7.
68. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 198.
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stockholders before it pays any dividend to the common stockholders. 69
In many cases, these dividend rights require the company to pay an an-
nual fixed dividend (e.g., 8 percent per year) to the preferred stockhold-
ers, similar to interest that accrues on debt. Section II.A.2 below,
however, details how Mexican law limits a Mexican company's ability to
pay dividends.7 0
(v) Limited Liquidation Rights
Preferred stock typically provides that, upon any liquidation,7' the
company must pay a portion of any assets that it has after paying its debts
first to the holders of preferred stock and then to the holders of common
stock. 72 In short, a liquidation preference allows the investor to retrieve
his investment from the company before other stockholders receive any
money. Mexican law provides that certain stockholders may enjoy a liq-
uidation preference, if such preference is included in the Mexican com-
pany's bylaws or is approved at an extraordinary shareholders meeting in
which the preferred stock issuance is approved; however, Mexican law
prohibits stockholders from waiving their right to participating in the
profits of the company. 73 Section II.A.2 below explores this issue in
greater detail.
(vi) Limited Redemption Rights
As discussed above, investors usually expect to be able to sell their
investments in a U.S. company either in a public sale, private sale to third
party, private sale to stockholder, or redemption. In many cases, redemp-
tion constitutes the investor's only viable exit from the company. Unfor-
tunately, Mexican law74 prohibits redemptions (except in limited cases), 75
thus depriving investors of a significant (and perhaps the only) way for
them to exit from their investment and preventing Mexican companies
from using restricted stock, as a Mexican company cannot purchase the
restricted stock of an employee who leaves the company or is terminated
prematurely.
69. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 118; Mayer, Brown & Platt, supra note
13, at 11.
70. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 19.
71. In private equity financings, the investment documents often provide that the com-
pany is deemed to have liquidated if it sells substantially all of its assets or the
stockholders agree to merge the company with another company.
72. BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 116, 118, 204. See Mayer, Brown & Platt,
supra note 13, at 11.
73. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 17.
74. See id. art. 134; see Morrison & Foerster, supra note 3, at 5-6.
75. Private Mexican companies cannot repurchase their own shares unless there is a
judicial order for the purpose of satisfying credit obligations. See General Law of
Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 134. See also infra notes 220 and 221.
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b. Weak Minority Stockholder Rights
In addition to the limitations imposed by the lack of flexible investment
structures, many investors find that existing Mexican corporate law does
not give them sufficient minority stockholder rights to protect their in-
vestment and to exit successfully from the company. One commentator
summarized the rights of minority stockholders in Mexican corporations
(sociedades anonimas) as follows:
[W]ith few exceptions, majority stockholders in Latin American cor-
porations can, as a matter of statutory right, impose their will on the
minority. Their dominant position when convening a stockholders's
meeting, adopting resolutions or distributing dividends has been bol-
stered by the lack of stockholders's derivative lawsuits or class action
mechanisms analogous to those available in the United States.76
Section II.B below outlines the weak position that minority stockhold-
ers generally have in Mexican companies.
c. Weak Enforcement Mechanisms
The problems related to minority stockholder rights are due partly to
the absence of effective legislation but mostly to the manner in which
these rights are enforced by Mexican courts.77 The Mexican court system
often has been characterized as slow and cumbersome and, in some cases,
corrupt. A recent analysis of Mexico's criminal judiciary system prepared
by the United Nations evidenced the need to introduce comprehensive
amendments to current procedures and applicable legislation.78 Some of
the conclusions reached for the criminal judiciary are also valid for the
entire Mexican judicial system, including the need to:
[E]ncourage greater accessibility of legal texts and judgments of su-
perior courts, the development and expansion of professional bar as-
sociations, increased fiscal resources for the judiciary, the protection
of privileges of access and confidentiality between lawyers and their
clients, assessment of the number of federal and state courts needed
to meet demand, alternative dispute resolution, mechanisms to re-
duce burdens on the judicial system, continuing legal education em-
phasizing international human rights standards, a uniform ethical
code for magistrates and judges, regular auditing of judges and mag-
istrates to monitor corruption, and greater transparency at all
levels.79
Although there have been some advances, such as the enactment of the
Transparency and Public Access to Information Law (Ley Federal de
76. See Jose W. Fernandez et al., Corporate Caveat Emptor: Minority Shareholder
Rights in Mexico, Chile, Brazil, Venezuela, and Argentina, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 157, 160.
77. See Morrison & Foerster, supra note 3, at 2, 5.
78. Center for U.S. - Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, Project on
Reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico, available at http://www.usmex.
ucsd.edu/justice/judiciary.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2003).
79. Id.
2003]
340 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 9
Transparencia y Acceso a la Informacion Publica Gubernamental),80
which improves access to public information, the absence of a reliable
judiciary system for the enforcement of contractual arrangements reduces
the attractiveness of Mexican ventures as recipients of private equity in-
vestments. To compensate for the weaknesses of the judiciary system,
investors must design complex and expensive contractual structures pro-
viding for "self execution mechanisms,""' adhere to costly private dispute
settlement mechanisms, such as international arbitration, or form U.S. or
other offshore holding companies. Sections II.B and III below outline
some of these alternative enforcement mechanisms.
d. Local Unfamiliarity with Private Equity Financing
Besides inflexible investment structures, weak minority stockholder
rights and poor enforcement mechanisms in Mexico, Mexico's legal infra-
structure - lawyers, accountants, judges, and bureaucracy often have little
experience with private equity investment structures, which adds to the
cost of making such investments in Mexico and increases the risk that
such investments will not be successful.
e. Limited Exits
As discussed in section II.C below, an investor's exit from an invest-
ment in a Mexican company is limited because (i) a redemption generally
is illegal in Mexico, 82 (ii) a public sale normally is not available (or viable)
to a small or mid-sized Mexican company,83 (iii) the pool of buyers will-
ing to purchase the stock or assets of a Mexican company in a private sale
to third party is relatively small, and (iv) other stockholders often are
unwilling or unable to purchase the investors equity in a private sale to
stockholder.
Even when an exit is available, the entrepreneur and investor may disa-
gree on whether to exploit it. That is, although the entrepreneur and in-
vestor share the common goal of maximizing the company's profits, they
may have conflicting interests deriving from the investor's desire to sell
his investment within three to five years after the initial investment date
and the entrepreneur's desire to maintain control of the company. With-
out the cooperation of the entrepreneur and an enforceable exit mecha-
nism, an investor has little hope of obtaining any return on its investment.
80. Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Informaci6n Ptiblica (enacted and pub-
lished in Mexico's Official Federation Gazzette on June 11, 2002), available at
http://www.profeco.gob.mx/new/html/leytrans.htm.
81. Jean Michel Enriquez, Recurring Legal Issues for Private Equity Funds in Mexico,
LATIN AM. L. & Bus. REP. (Aug. 31, 1999) 24-28.
82. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 134; Morrison &
Foerster, supra note 3, at 5-6. See also infra notes 220 and 221.
83. See Kossick & Neckelmann, supra note 4, at 114, 166; Barham, supra note 37, at
31-33; Kilby, supra note 19, at 32-34; Pascual, supra note 11, at IV.
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f. Regulatory Obstacles
(i) Limits on Foreign Ownership
Mexico has one of the most stringent foreign investment law regula-
tions in Latin America. The current Foreign Investment Law (Ley de
Inversion Extranjera),84 one of several compromises under the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTFA), prohibits or restricts foreign
ownership in strategic areas exclusively reserved for the Mexican state, 85
areas exclusively reserved for Mexican nationals or Mexican corporations
whose bylaws must include a specific provision prohibiting the participa-
tion of foreign investment,86 activities and/or industries where foreign in-
vestment is permitted but capped to a specific maximum percentage stock
participation, 87 and activities and/or industries that require authorization
for foreign participation to exceed 49 percent. 88 As a result, foreign pri-
vate equity may not have access to certain economic segments, and may
not exceed certain participation percentages in others.89
As a result, investors considering an investment in a regulated area
face additional costs and delays in order to obtain governmental approv-
als. Even in industries where a degree of foreign ownership is permissi-
ble, foreign funds often prefer not to waste time identifying potential
deals because ownership constraints may limit their flexibility and profit
84. Foreign Investment Law (Ley de Inversion Extranjera, Diario Oficial, 27 de
deciembre de 1993). The Foreign Investment Law was enacted in 1993. The Regu-
lations to the Foreign Investment Law and to the National Registry of Foreign
Investment (Reglamento de Ley Inversion Extranjera y del Registro Nacional de
Inversiones Extranjera, Diario Oficial, 8 de septiembre de 1998) were issued in 1998
to clarify certain provisions of the Foreign Investment Law.
85. Petroleum and other hydrocarbons, basic petrochemicals, electricity, nuclear en-
ergy generation, radioactive minerals, telegraph, radiotelegraphy, postal services,
printing of bills and currency, coin minting, control, supervision and vigilance in
ports, airports and heliports. Political Constitution of the United Mexican States
(Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos). CONST. art. 28, L.I.E. art.
5. Foreign Investment Law, supra note 84.
86. Domestic land transport of passenger, tourists, and cargo, not including messenger
or package delivery services; retail trade in gasoline and liquefied petroleum gas;
radio broadcasting and other radio and television services, other than cable televi-
sion; credit unions; development banks and institutions, in terms of the law gov-
erning the matter; and the rendering of such professional or technical services as
are expressly established in the applicable legal provisions. L.I.E. art. 6, Foreign
Investment Law, supra note 84.
87. A maximum of 25 percent foreign ownership is allowed in domestic air transporta-
tion and a maximum of 49 percent in currency exchange houses and insurance
companies. Id. art. 7.
88. For example, cellular phone and legal services require an authorization from the
Foreign Investment National Commission (Comisi6n Nacional de Inversiones Ex-
tranjeras) for the foreign investment to exceed 49 percent. See id. art. 8.
89. The Foreign Investment Law, however, allows Mexican companies to issue neutral
or series "N" shares to foreign investors to allow them to exceed the limitations on
the permitted ownership interest in a Mexican company. Series "N" shares are not
counted in calculating the foreign ownership of a Mexican company. They grant
their holders a full economic interest (but limited corporate rights) in the company
and require the prior approval of the Foreign Investment National Commission
and of the National Banking and Securities Commission (Comisidn Nacional Ban-
caria y de Valores), if applicable. Id. art. 20.
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potential; thus foreign investors sometimes tend to steer away from the
list of industries where foreign investment is limited to a given percentage
and investment approval is required by law.
(ii) Antitrust Restrictions
To protect competition in Mexico, a Mexican company that will receive
a private equity investment must file a notice of investment with the Fed-
eral Competition Commission (Comisi6n Federal de Competencia) if the
size of the company, investors, or proposed investment exceeds certain
thresholds set forth in the Federal Law of Economic Competition (Ley
Federal de Competencia Econ6mica).90 Such filing consists of a question-
naire with information about the company, the investors, and the pro-
posed investment, including annual reports, audited financial statements,
and investor background information. In addition, certain investments in
specific industries (such as telecommunications and banking) may require
additional governmental approvals from the authorities regulating such
industry.
(iii) Currency Exchange Controls
Under current Mexican law, investors are not restricted in the amount
of Mexican currency that they can exchange into U.S. dollars or other
foreign currency. There are no filings before the Central Bank (Banco de
Mixico) or authorizations required for the remittance of dollar denomi-
nated dividends back to the investor's country. Before NAFTA, and at
different stages throughout time, several currency control exchange
mechanisms were put into effect either to help overcome financial crisis
or as a continuing monetary policy. However, since NAFTA came to life
90. Federal Law of Economic Competition (Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6nica),
art. 20, establishes:
"The Commission must be notified of the following concentrations before
they are carried out:
1. If the value of a single transaction or series of transactions amounts to
over 12 million times the minimum general wage prevailing in the Federal
District;" (approximately $46,767,857 in U.S. dollars at an exchange rate of
eleven pesos for one U.S. Dollar in force in March 2003).
II. "If a single transaction or series of transactions implies accumulation of
35 percent or more of the assets or shares of an economic agent, whose assets
or sales amount to more than 12 million times the minimum general wage
prevailing in the Federal District;" or (approximately $46,767,857 in U.S.
Dollars at an exchange rate of eleven pesos for one U.S. dollar in force in
March 2003).
1II. "If two or more economic agents take part in the transaction, and their
assets or annual volume of sales, jointly or separately, total more than 48
million times the minimum general wage prevailing in the Federal District,
and such transaction implies an additional accumulation of assets or capital
stock in excess of four million eight hundred thousand times the minimum
general wage prevailing in the Federal District" (approximately $18,707,142
in U.S. dollars at an exchange rate of eleven pesos for one U.S. dollar in
force in March 2003).
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in 1994, these currency control obligations and mechanisms have disap-
peared and have not been reinstalled, not even through the 1994 "Tequila
Effect" crisis.
3. Political Risks
Investors making private equity investments in Mexican companies
also confront certain political risks, such as political upheaval and the ex-
propriation of property by the Mexican government. Note that chapter
11 of NAFTA protects investors of one NAFTA country making invest-
ments in another NAFTA country against various political risks, includ-
ing expropriations, 91 performance requirements, 92 prohibited transfers,93
and obligatory local management.94 In short, NAFTA requires each
NAFTA country to treat investors of another NAFTA country and their
investments no less favorably than its own investors and no less favorably
than investors of other countries. At a minimum, each NAFTA country
must treat investors from another NAFTA country in accordance with
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protec-
tion and security. Mexican law also requires the Mexican government to
pay the market value of any expropriated property, regardless of whether
it is owned by a Mexican or a foreigner.
Despite some isolated problems, such as the Indian uprising in Chiapas
in 1994, Mexico has a track record of peace and social stability for the
past seven decades. The successful and peaceful democratic transition in
2000 from the long-standing Partido Revolucionario Instituional (PRI) to
the Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) headed by President Fox, established
an important milestone for Mexico and has increased investor confidence
both within and outside the country. Observers agree that the current
administration is working hard to control crime by increasing security,95
preventing corruption and drug trafficking, and enforcing the law.
91. No NAFTA country may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an invest-
ment of an investor of another NAFTA country except for a public purpose, on a
nondiscriminatory basis, in accordance with due process of law, and international
law and on payment of fair and adequate compensation. See North American Free
Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, art. 1101 [hereinafter NAFTA].
92. No NAFTA country may impose or enforce "performance requirements" in con-
nection with investments in its territory, such as commitments or undertakings re-
lating to exports, domestic content, local sourcing, trade balancing, technology
transfer, or product mandates. See id.
93. Subject to certain exceptions, no NAFrA country may prevent an investor of an-
other NAFTA country from making transfers relating to its investment, including
profits, dividends, interest, capital gains, royalty payments, management fees, tech-
nical assistance, or proceeds from the sale or liquidation of an investment. See id.
94. No NAFTA country may require a company formed under such country's laws,
which is an investment of an investor from another NAF1FA country, to appoint
individuals of a certain nationality to senior management positions. A NAFTA
country may, however, require that a majority of the board of directors or any
committee thereof, be of a particular nationality. See id.
95. National Program of Public Safety of Mexico, Jan. 14, 2003, at http://www.ssp.gob.
mx/a-conoce_a_la_ssp/marcojuridico/dof/dof_14-01-2003.pdf.
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II. KEY ISSUES IN THE PRIVATE EQUITY PROCESS
Section I above reviewed the fundamentals of private equity financing,
including the general process for obtaining such financing. Section II fo-
cuses on key issues within this process that entrepreneurs should con-
sider. To organize the discussion of these issues, the process is discussed
in three stages - obtaining private equity financing, living with it, and
ending the financing through the exit process.
A. OBTAINING PRIVATE EQUITY
This first section focuses on the key issues that the entrepreneur should
consider in negotiating the terms of the investor's investment in the
company.
1. Due Diligence Review
As mentioned above, once an investor has reviewed the company's full
business plan and decides to pursue further discussions with the entrepre-
neur, the investor will perform a due diligence investigation of the entre-
preneur's business, employees, and business plan. The entrepreneur
should use this time to conduct due diligence on the fund as well. To
protect themselves and their confidential and proprietary information,
the entrepreneur and investor should each sign a mutual non-disclosure
agreement to prevent each party from disclosing or using any of the infor-
mation obtained from the other party for improper purposes. Below is a
list of key materials that the entrepreneur should expect the investor to
review in its due diligence investigation of the company and the entrepre-
neur should review in his due diligence investigation of the investor.
a. Due Diligence by Investor
An investor generally begins the formal due diligence process by giving
the entrepreneur a due diligence checklist listing the materials that the
investor wants to review in the entrepreneur's business. A basic due dili-
gence checklist is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Some of the more impor-
tant items on this checklist that the investor will want to review are
discussed below.
(i) Corporate Structure
The investor will want to review the company's organizational docu-
ments and corporate books, board and stockholder resolutions, powers of
attorney, and other corporate records in order to understand its corpo-
rate structure (such as Sociedad Anonima, Sociedad de Responsibilidad
Limitada, and the like) and to ensure that the company is operating in
conformity with its corporate purpose, its internal procedures, and appli-
cable law.96
96. See Kossick & Neckelmann, supra note 4, at 127-30.
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(ii) Capital Structure
The entrepreneur should also expect to provide the investor with a
copy of the company's stock ledger and other records listing all of the
company's stockholders, the amount and class of stock that each hold,
and any special rights or restrictions that any of the stockholders have.
The fund also will need to ensure that all of the company's stock was
issued in conformity with applicable law.97
(iii) Financial Condition
Perhaps the most important aspect of the investor's due diligence is
obtaining accurate historical and pro forma financial information about
the company, including its business plans and budgets, the reports, audits
and opinions of the company's directors, comisarios, and external audi-
tors, and statements from the company's bank, and its brokerage and in-
vestment accounts.98 The common practice of maintaining two or even
three sets of accounting records in order to avoid the tax collector frus-
trates the due diligence team's task of gaining an accurate picture of ac-
tual performance. 99
(iv) Material Agreements
Investors will also review all of the company's material agreements,
including employment contracts with the company's key employees,
agreements with the company's suppliers, customers, affiliates, and com-
petitors, any documents evidencing any indebtedness of (or owed to) the
company, and any contracts related to the company's assets, including
intellectual property. 00
(v) Disputes
Entrepreneurs will also be asked to disclose any information about any
pending or threatened litigation, disputes, proceedings, or investigations
involving the company, including any labor or tax claims against the
company.101
Many investors experience difficulty in conducting due diligence on
companies in Mexico, particularly on family-owned businesses. Observa-
tions about conducting due diligence on such companies includes:
Because due diligence is prodding and invasive, the process can pose
a problem with respect to small and medium-sized commercial enter-
prises in Latin America. Having often been run in the same way by a
single family (or group of families) for generations, the typical small
to medium-sized entity may be unfamiliar with and/or hostile to the
rules, procedures and timetables entailed in a private equity fund's
97. See id. at 128-29.
98. See id. at 131-33.
99. See Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 3, at 7.
100. See Kossick & Neckelmann, supra note 4, at 133.
101. See id. at 127-28.
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due diligence. Moreover, as a result of not previously having had to
open itself up to outside examination, many of these firms may not
be accustomed to sharing otherwise secret information with non-
family members. As one Mexican economist notes, "family-owned
firms ... are extremely reluctant to give any information ... not out
of dishonesty, but out of a parochial attitude." Echoing this thought,
a senior analyst at a Mexico City brokerage house, adds: "It's a prob-
lem of culture. It's a very closed culture. 10 2
Due diligence is a standard practice in financing transactions and is a
prerequisite to any investment. In short, a private equity investment is a
marriage of sorts, so the investor needs to get to know the entrepreneur
and his business - the good and the bad - before entering into the
relationship.
b. Due Diligence by Entrepreneur
While the investor is conducting its due diligence investigation, the en-
trepreneur should conduct due diligence on the investor and its fund. 10 3
The entrepreneur, at a minimum, should ask the investor about the fol-
lowing things:
(i) The fund itself (Does the fund have money to invest now? Is the
fund able and willing to participate in the current and future
financings? How many years remain for the fund to makeinvestments?);' 114
(ii) The fund's investment in the company (What kind of return does
the investor need to make on this investment? When does the
investor need to exit from this investment? What if there is no
exit event by that date?);
(iii) The investor's other investments (In what companies has the
fund made investments? What services, if any, does the investor
provide to its portfolio companies?);
(iv) The investor's relationship with management of its portfolio
companies (How has the investor handled management changes
in the past? Has the fund pushed any entrepreneur out of a com-
pany?); and
(v) The investor's relationship with other investors (Is the investor
willing to co-invest in the company with other investors? If so,
which ones? Has the investor made any distributions or other
payments to its fund investors?). 10 5
102. See id. at 124-25.
103. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 196; GLADSTONE, supra note 26, at 164-
66.
104. The life of private equity funds usually is seven to ten years. See supra note 19.
Given that a fund sometimes does not make an investment in a company until its
third year or later, the fund's managers seek to exit from such investment within
three to five years after the date of such investment in order to channel the pro-
ceeds to the fund's investors on time.
105. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 196; GLADSTONE, supra note 26, at 164-
66.
PRIVATE EQUITY IN MEXICO
The entrepreneur should also talk with the management of the inves-
tor's other portfolio companies and with the investor's bankers, lawyers,
and accountants to determine what kind of partner the investor will likely
be. 1(6
2. Key Terms in Term Sheet
After the investor has completed his due diligence examination and has
indicated a serious interest in making an investment, the investor (or his
attorney) prepares a term sheet to outline the main investment terms.
We discuss below some of the most important of these terms. The parties
generally may reach an agreement on these terms quickly or realize that
an agreement is unattainable. In either case, the parties save time and
money by focusing on the major terms first.
a. Type of Security
One of the most fundamental decisions that the investor and entrepre-
neur make is determining the type of security (common stock, preferred
stock, convertible debt, and the like) that the investor will buy from the
company. Of course, the type of security that the fund will purchase
often depends on whether the fund is investing in a Mexican company or
a U.S. holding company. A fund that invests in a Mexican company may
accept either equity, debt, or a mixture of equity and debt in exchange for
its investment. 10 7 A fund investing in a U.S. holding company, however,
generally expects to receive preferred stock in exchange for its invest-
ment. 08 Naturally, if the U.S. holding company is distressed or it only
needs to raise a small amount of money to meet a short-term obligation
(such as payroll, loan repayment, etc.), the investor often will make a
bridge loan to the company in return for a note that is convertible into
either common or preferred stock and warrants to purchase additional
stock at a favorable price. 0 9
In contrast to investors, "friends and family" of the entrepreneur typi-
cally receive common stock in return for their investment. 110 Some angel
investors accept common stock for their investment, while others expect
preferred stock and many require a bridge note plus warrants."'
106. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 196; GLADSTONE, supra note 26, at 164-
66.
107. For example, in return for its $2 million investment, an investor might receive: (i) a
secured note for $500,000; (ii) an unsecured, convertible note for $750,000; (iii)
preferred stock worth $400,000; and (iv) 2 percent of the net revenues of the
company.
108. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 202; HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 43, at
6-7; Mayer, Brown & Platt, supra note 13, at 10.
109. See HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 6-3; Mayer, Brown & Platt, supra note 13,
at 10.
110. See Mayer, Brown & Platt, supra note 13, at 10.
111. See HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 6-3; Mayer, Brown & Platt, supra note 13,
at 10.
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Note that the entrepreneur may also want to issue preferred stock to
an investor so that the company can sell two different classes of its stock
at different prices: the higher priced preferred stock to investors and the
lower priced common stock to its employees in the form of restricted
stock and stock options.' 2
b. Valuation
Another important term that the investor and entrepreneur must nego-
tiate is the value of the company. The various methods by which inves-
tors determine the value of a company are beyond the scope of this
article, but, it suffices to say, the valuation of a company depends on the
value of comparable companies (if any), the experience of the company's
management team, the size of the market for its goods and services, the
viability of the entrepreneur's business plan, the company's stage of
growth, what milestones it has attained, what competitors exist, and the
amount of revenue and/or profits that the company has. 113
The valuation of the company determines the price that the investor
will pay for the company's stock and the percentage of the company that
the investor will own. That is, once the investor and entrepreneur have
negotiated the pre-money valuation of the company (the value of the
company immediately before the investor makes its investment) and the
investor decides how much money it will invest in the company, the par-
ties can determine the post-money valuation of the company (the value of
the company immediately after the investment),' 14 the price per share,11 5
the percentage of the company that the investor will own after the invest-
ment, 1 6 and the number of shares that the company will issue to the
investor in return for his investment.1 1 7
112. See HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 6-7.
113. Interestingly, one prominent investor in Latin America advises investors never to
pay more than seven to eight times earnings for a company. See Barham, supra
note 37, at 32.
114. The post-money valuation is calculated by adding the amount of the investment to
the amount of the pre-money valuation. For example, if the amount of the invest-
ment is $1 million and the pre-money valuation of the company is $3 million, the
post-money valuation of the company is $4 million.
115. The price per share is calculated by dividing the pre-money valuation by the num-
ber of shares that the company has issued and outstanding before the investment
(the outstanding pre-money shares). Using the examples above and assuming the
company has six million outstanding pre-money shares, the investor will pay $0.50
per share ($3 million pre-money valuation divided by six million outstanding pre-
money shares).
116. The percentage of the company that the investor will own after the investment is
calculated by dividing the amount of the investment by the post-money valuation.
Using the example in note 114 above, the investor will own 25 percent ($1 million
investment divided by $4 million post-money valuation) of the company after the
investment.
117. The number of shares that the company will issue to the investor is calculated by
dividing the amount of the investment by the price per share. Using the example
in notes 114 and 115 above, the company will issue two million shares to the inves-
tor ($1 million investment divided by $0.50 per share). If the entrepreneur knows
only the percentage of the company that the investor wants to purchase, he can
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In the event that the parties cannot determine the pre-money valuation
of the company (or want to postpone making such determination until
the company attracts more money or investors), the investor often makes
his investment in the form of a bridge loan that is convertible into the
type of security (such as preferred stock) issued in a subsequent round of
financing. To induce the investor to make such bridge loan, the company
will often give the investors warrants to purchase additional stock (usu-
ally common or preferred stock) at a favorable price or convert the inves-
tor's note at a discount.
Note that the investor who is willing to pay the highest price is not
necessarily the best investor for the company. Another investor who is
not willing to pay quite as much may be a better partner for growing the
business in that such investor's business experience and/or contacts may
prove to be more valuable to the company in the long run.118 Also, as
discussed in section II.A.3 below regarding price protection anti-dilution
rights, getting a high valuation in one round of financing actually can hurt
the entrepreneur in a subsequent round of financing if the valuation of
the company in the subsequent round is lower than its valuation in the
earlier round. For example, after the NASDAQ bubble burst in 2000,
many companies could only secure equity financing at a fraction of the
valuation that they had obtained before the collapse and consequently
the anti-dilution rights that the investors had in these companies severely
diluted (and often effectively erased) the ownership interests of their en-
trepreneurs and other common stockholders in their own companies. In
short, it may be in the entrepreneur's interest to negotiate a "fair" valua-
tion of the company instead of the "highest" valuation.
Entrepreneurs also should be aware that certain legal terms might in-
crease the effective ownership percentage that the investor has in the
company, which in some cases shifts the effective valuation that the par-
ties have negotiated. The paragraphs below describe these legal rights
and section II.A.3 discusses how these legal rights can be used to change
the effective ownership percentage and valuation of the company.
c. Preferred Stock Rights
If the fund and entrepreneur agree that the company will issue pre-
ferred stock to the fund in exchange for its investment in the company,
calculate the number of shares that the company will issue to the investor by first
calculating the total number of shares that the company will have outstanding after
the investment (i.e., the outstanding post-money shares) and then subtracting the
number of outstanding pre-money shares from the number of outstanding post-
money shares. To determine the total number of outstanding post-money shares,
divide the number of outstanding pre-money shares by one minus the percentage
of the company that the investor will own post-money. Using the examples above,
the total number of outstanding post-money shares is eight million (six million
outstanding pre-money shares divided by one minus 0.25, and the company will
need to issue two million shares (eight million outstanding post-money shares mi-
nus six million outstanding pre-money shares) to the investor.
118. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 201.
2003]
350 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 9
the negotiations between the parties then turn to the types of rights that
the preferred stock will have. Below is a discussion of some of the most
important rights that holders of preferred stock can have. Although
Mexican law allows a Mexican company to have different classes of stock
(preferred vs. common stock), 119 many of the rights discussed below may
only be available in a U.S. holding company, given certain legal restric-
tions on the use of such mechanisms by a Mexican company.
(i) Liquidation Preference
A liquidation preference generally provides that, upon liquidation of a
company (or when the company sells its assets or stock), 120 the company
must pay any property that it owns after it pays its debts first to the hold-
ers of preferred stock and then to the holders of common stock. The
amount of this liquidation preference generally is in an amount at least
equal to the investor's original investment plus all unpaid dividends, 121
but liquidation preferences today sometimes allow the investor to receive
150 percent, 200 percent, or more of its original investment (plus unpaid
dividends) before the common stockholders receive any money. 122
Moreover, if an investor holds participating preferred stock, it is entitled
to receive its liquidation preference plus its pro rata share of the assets
that remain as if the preferred stock had converted to common stock af-
ter receiving its liquidation preference (the investor is able to "double-
dip" into the company's assets). If the investor holds nonparticipating
preferred stock, it must elect either to receive its liquidation preference
or convert to common stock and receive its pro rata share of the assets
that the common stockholders receive.
Mexican law, however, does not allow stockholders to waive their right
to participate in the profits of the company. 123 This means that stock-
holders cannot waive their right to receive equity payments in advance.
This prohibition, however, does not prevent a Mexican company from
issuing preferred stock that has liquidation and dividend rights that might
require the company, upon liquidation, to pay all of its equity to the in-
vestor and not to any other stockholder. Nevertheless, this limitation on
liquidation rights might act as a disincentive to investors interested in
making private equity investments in a Mexican company.
119. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 112.
120. In private equity financings, the investment documents often provide that the com-
pany is deemed to have liquidated if it sells all or substantially all of its assets or
the company is acquired by another entity through a merger or consolidation.
121. The company may have to pay only dividends that the company declared or it may
have to pay dividends that have accrued, regardless of whether the company de-
clared them or not. BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 116-18, 204. See Mayer,
Brown & Platt, supra note 13, at 11.
122. BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 116-18, 204. See Mayer, Brown & Platt,
supra note 13, at 11.
123. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 17.
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(ii) Dividend Rights
Preferred stock often has dividend rights that require the company to
pay any dividend that it declares to the preferred stockholders before it
pays any dividend to the common stockholders.124 In many cases, a fund
requires the company to pay it a fixed dividend (for example, 8 percent of
the investment amount) each year, regardless of whether the company
has declared a dividend or not, thus giving investors a right that is similar
to an interest payment on debt. In sum, dividend rights may require the
company to pay only dividends that the company declared or dividends
that have accrued, regardless of whether the company declared them or
not. If these dividend rights are cumulative, dividends that are not paid
to the preferred stockholders in one year are added to the dividend
amounts that must be paid to them in subsequent years before any com-
mon stock dividend may be paid. 125 Conversely, if these dividend rights
are noncumulative, the fixed dividends not paid on the preferred shares
in one year are lost and are not required to be added to any dividends
that must be paid in subsequent years. A company generally pays cumu-
lative dividends in cash only upon redemption or liquidation of the com-
pany, not when the preferred stock is converted into common stock. U.S.
law generally allows companies to pay dividends except in limited cases
(e.g., the dividend payment defrauds creditors).
Mexican law allows Mexican companies to issue cumulative and
noncumulative preferred stock, but a Mexican company cannot pay divi-
dends to its stockholders unless losses in capital from prior years have
been made up or the stockholders have approved a reduction in the com-
pany's capital and other actions. 12 6 This is a problem in private equity
financings because dividends are an important (and sometimes the only)
source of return on the fund's investment.
(iii) Redemption Rights
As discussed above, redemption occurs when a company repurchases
its stock from a stockholder. Voluntary redemption rights, also called a
put option, allows the investor to require the company to redeem (repur-
chase) its stock for cash at a specified time and price.127 Involuntary re-
demption rights, also called a call option, allow the company to redeem
the investor's stock for a specific price upon the occurrence of a certain
event. 128 An investor typically does not exercise his put option unless he
otherwise cannot exit from its investment. In the United States, private
124. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 118; Mayer, Brown & Platt, supra note
13, at 11.
125. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 118; Mayer, Brown & Platt, supra note
13, at 11.
126. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, arts. 18, 19.
127. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 118-19.
128. See id.
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companies generally may redeem their shares except in limited cases
(such as where the redemption defrauds creditors).
Mexican law, however, specifically prohibits private Mexican compa-
nies from redeeming their shareholders' stock unless it is judicially or-
dered for the purpose of satisfying credit obligations. 129 Moreover,
Mexican law prescribes that board members and officers who authorize
an unauthorized redemption of shares have personal joint and several
liability for any damages and lost profits caused to the company and/or to
the creditors of the company. When a Mexican company is authorized to
redeem shares, it must sell such shares within three months after it ob-
tains title to such shares. If the Mexican company fails to sell these shares
within such time period, the shares will be extinguished and the Mexican
company's capital will be decreased. During the time the company holds
title to its shares, no one can exercise any corporate rights with respect to
such shares. 130 Only Mexican companies listed in the securities registry
of the National Securities Registry (Registro Nacional de Valores) are ex-
empt from the general prohibition against redemption.131
Although the prohibition against redemption may protect minority
stockholders in a Mexican company against the majority, it also deprives
investors of a critical (and in some cases, the last chance to) exit from its
investment. Investors may seek alternative structures to allow for the ef-
fective redemption of their shares, such as setting aside a certain percent-
age of shares in an escrow, using a trust vehicle or forming an offshore
holding company (such as a U.S. holding company).
(iv) Conversion Rights
Conversion rights allow the holders of preferred stock to convert their
preferred stock into common stock at any time. The ratio at which pre-
ferred stock is converted into common stock typically is determined by
dividing the initial purchase price of the preferred stock by a number
called the conversion price, which is adjusted upon the occurrence of cer-
tain anti-dilution events (see anti-dilution rights below). 132 Initially, the
conversion price typically is equal to the purchase price of the preferred
stock, so the preferred stock converts into common stock on a one-to-one
basis.133
Mexican law authorizes Mexican companies to issue different catego-
ries of stock, including preferred stock, which may be converted into ordi-
129. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 134; Morrison &
Foerster, supra note 3, at 5; BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 118-19. See also
infra notes 220-221.
130. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 134.
131. Securities Market Law (Ley del Mercado de Valores), art. 14, bis 3.1.
132. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 119-20, 210-11.
133. See id.
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nary stock. 134 When approving the issuance of convertible stock, the
Mexican company must issue a sufficient amount of treasury stock (i.e.,
stock that the Mexican company issues, but which is not subscribed and
which is held in the company's treasury) to be granted to the stockholders
upon conversion.
(v) Anti-dilution Rights
Anti-dilution rights protect investors against the dilution (i.e., reduc-
tion) of their ownership interest in the company (percentage protection)
and the price that the investors paid for their preferred stock (price pro-
tection) by adjusting the conversion price at which the preferred stock
converts into common stock.1 35 These two types of anti-dilution rights
are described below.
(a) Percentage Protection
Each time that a company issues stock, the ownership percentage of
each of the existing stockholders of the company is decreased. To protect
against such dilution, investors often require the company to give them
two types of percentage protection: (i) structural anti-dilution protection,
and (ii) preemptive rights.136
(1) Structural Anti-dilution Protection
In the case of structural anti-dilution protection, if the company issues
a stock dividend, stock split, reverse split, or similar recapitalization, the
conversion price is adjusted to ensure that the number of shares of com-
mon stock issuable upon conversion of the preferred stock represents the
same percentage of ownership (on an as-converted basis) as existed prior
to the stock dividend, stock split, reverse split, or recapitalization. 137 For
example, if there is a four-to-one stock split, the conversion price would
be reduced to one fourth of its prior amount. 138 So, if the conversion
price was one dollar prior to the split, it would be twenty-five cents after
the split; upon conversion the company would issue to the investor four
times the number of common shares after the split that the investor
would have received prior to the split. 13 9 In Mexico, structural anti-dilu-
tion protection provisions may be included in the extraordinary stock-
holder's resolution approving the issuance of the convertible preferred
stock since such protection is based on a formula applicable to all
stockholders.
134. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 112 (which specifi-
cally authorizes the issuance of different categories of stock, with special rights for
each category).
135. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 119, 212.
136. See id. at 212-13.
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(2) Preemptive Rights
If the company wishes to issue stock to someone, a preemptive right
gives the investor the right to purchase all or its pro rata share of such
issuance so that the investor will not be diluted by such issuance and will
maintain at least the same ownership percentage after the stock issuance
that it had before such issuance.140 As discussed above, Mexican law
gives preemptive rights to all stockholders. Such rights cannot be waived
in advance, thus limiting the ability of the Mexican company to issue
stock options and warrants, grant price protection anti-dilution rights and
registration rights (discussed below), and implement other mechanisms
commonly used in private equity financings.14 1 Preemptive rights are not




Price protection protects investors against paying too much for their
preferred stock. That is, if a company issues additional shares of common
or preferred stock in the future at a price that is less than the investor's
conversion price at the time of such issuance, price protection requires
the company to adjust the investor's conversion price downward so that
the investor obtains the benefit of such lower price when he converts his
preferred shares into common shares. 143 Just how downward the inves-
tor's conversion price is adjusted depends on whether the investor has
"full ratchet" or "weighted average" price protection, each of which is
described below. Price protection is based on the theory that the valua-
tion of a company when the investor makes its investment is open to de-
bate, so the investor is entitled to a price adjustment if the company
really was overvalued. 144 If overvalued, it is easier for the company to
simply adjust the conversion price to give the investor more common
shares than to give the investor of portion of his money back. 145
140. See id. at 212-13. Generally, the company will be allowed to issue certain types of
stock without triggering preemptive rights, such as issuances of a certain amount of
common stock or stock options to employees, directors and consultants, common
stock upon conversion of preferred stock, stock dividends, warrants to banks or
equipment lessors, stock in mergers or other types of business combinations, and
common stock in the company's IPO.
141. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 132; Morrison &
Foerster, supra note 3, at 3.
142. See General Law of Titles and Credit Operations (Ley General de Titulos y Opera-
ciones de Credito), art. 210 bis.
143. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 120,213-14. Generally, the company will
be allowed to issue certain types of stock without triggering price protection anti-
dilution rights, such as issuances of a certain amount of common stock or stock
options to employees, directors and consultants, common stock upon conversion of
preferred stock, stock dividends, warrants to banks or equipment lessors, stock in
mergers or other types of business combinations, and common stock in the com-
pany's IPO.
144. See id. at 213.
145. See id.
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Below is a brief description of the two basic types of price protection:
full ratchet and weighted average.
(1) Full Ratchet Price Protection
Full ratchet price protection is onerous from the company's perspective
because if the company issues stock (even just one share) in the future at
a price that is less than the conversion price at which the investor's pre-
ferred stock converts to common stock, the investor's conversion price is
reduced to the price at which the company sold such stock. So, if the
investor purchases his stock for U.S.$1.00 per share and the company
subsequently issues stock at U.S.$0.01 per share, the investor's conversion
price is reduced from U.S.$1.00 to U.S.$0.01, thus greatly increasing the
investor's ownership percentage in the company when he converts his
preferred stock to common stock.
(2) Weighted Average Price Protection
Weighted average price protection is less onerous from the company's
perspective because if the company issues stock in the future at a price
that is less than the investor's applicable conversion price, the conversion
price is reduced to a price somewhere between the applicable conversion
price and the lower price at which the company sold such future stock.
So, if the investor purchases his stock for U.S. $1.00 per share and the
company subsequently issues stock at U.S.$0.01 per share, the investor's
conversion price is reduced from U.S.$1.00 in accordance with the follow-
ing formula:
Adjusted Conversion Price = CP x ((CS1 + (NP / CP)) / CS2)
Where:
CP = the investor's conversion price in effect immediately prior to
the issuance of the new, cheaper stock.
CS1 = the number of shares of common stock outstanding (on an as-
converted basis) immediately before the issuance of the new,
cheaper stock.
CS2 = the number of shares of common stock outstanding (on an as-
converted basis) immediately before the issuance of the new,
cheaper stock plus the number of shares of new, cheaper
stock.
NP = the net proceeds that the company received in exchange for
the new, cheaper stock.
Section 11.3 below details how these two basic types of price protection
can change the effective ownership percentage of the investor in the
company.
A Mexican company's bylaws or shareholder resolution may authorize
anti-dilution price protection provisions similar to those discussed above,
provided that such provisions do not violate any statutory non-waivable
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rights (such as dividend, preemptive, and liquidation rights). Further-
more, Mexican law forbids a Mexican company from issuing stock below
its nominal value and provides that any proposal that may affect the
rights of any category of stockholders - in this case holders of preferred
convertible stock - requires the prior approval of the holders of stock of
such category.' 46 Thus, in addition to the two statutory provisions men-
tioned above, Mexican companies can build into their own bylaws provi-
sions protecting the holders of preferred stock from dilution resulting
from subsequent issuances of stock.
3. Terms that Change the Effective Ownership of the Company
The preceding section described the types of legal rights that preferred
stock often carries. The next section discusses how these legal rights can
be used to change the effective ownership percentage and valuation of
the company, allowing the investor to own more of the company than the
entrepreneur bargained for (or thought he bargained for).
a. Liquidation Preference
A preferred stock's liquidation preference can increase the effective
ownership that the investor has in the company, and decrease the effec-
tive valuation of the company. To illustrate, consider the following three
types of liquidation preferences and the effect each has upon the effective
ownership and valuation of the company. The three types of liquidation
preferences are: (i) standard liquidation preference, (ii) double dip liqui-
dation preference, and (iii) multiple of investment amount liquidation
preference. For purposes of this illustration, assume that the company
had a $3 million pre-money valuation, the investor made a $1 million in-
vestment in the company (giving the company a $4 million post-money
valuation), the investor received 25 percent of the company ($1 million
investment / $4 million post-money valuation) in the form of two million
shares of preferred stock (out of eight million outstanding post-money
shares), and the investor is entitled to an annual, accrued dividend equal
to 8 percent of its $1 million investment ($80,000 per year).
(i) Standard Liquidation Preference
An investor who holds nonparticipating preferred stock 147 has a stan-
dard liquidation preference, meaning that the investor must choose either
to receive his liquidation preference or convert his preferred stock to
common stock and receive his pro rata share of the assets that the com-
mon stockholders receive. That is, when the company liquidates (or is
deemed to have liquidated), 148 the company must pay to the investor,
after the company has paid its debts but before it pays any amount to its
146. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, arts. 115, 195.
147. See section I.A.2.c.l supra.
148. See supra note 120.
PRIVATE EQUITY IN MEXICO
other stockholders, an amount equal to the greater of either (i) the inves-
tor's original investment (in this example, $1 million) plus all accrued and
unpaid dividends; or (ii) the investor's pro rata share of the company's
assets as if the investor had converted his preferred stock to common
stock immediately prior to the liquidation. So, if the company is sold for
$10 million soon after the investor's investment, the investor would re-
ceive, before any other stockholder, the greater of (i) $1 million (the orig-
inal investment), 49 or (ii) $2.5 million (25 percent of $10 million). If the
investor elects to take the $2.5 million payment, the investor's effective
ownership in the company (25 percent) 150 is the same as his stock owner-
ship (25 percent). 15 1
If, however, the company is sold for only $3 million soon after the in-
vestor's investment, the investor would receive, before any stockholder,
the greater of (i) $1 million (its original investment), or (ii) $750,000
(which represents 25 percent of $3 million). If the investor elects to take
the $1 million payment, the investor's effective ownership in the company
(33 percent) 152 is greater than his stock ownership (25 percent). 153
(ii) Double Dip Liquidation Preference
An investor who holds participating preferred stock 154 has a double dip
liquidation preference, meaning that the investor is entitled to receive his
liquidation preference and also his pro rata share of the assets that re-
main as if the preferred stock had converted to common stock. When the
company liquidates, the company must pay to the investor, after the com-
pany has paid its debts but before it pays any amount to its other stock-
holders, an amount equal to both (i) the investor's original investment
($1 million) plus all accrued and unpaid dividends ($80,000 per year), and
(ii) the investor's pro rata share of the company's assets as if the investor
had converted his preferred stock to common stock immediately prior to
the liquidation. So, if the company is sold for $10 million soon after the
investor's investment, the investor would receive, before any other stock-
holder, both (i) $1 million (the original investment), 55 and (ii) $2.25 mil-
lion (25 percent of $9 million remaining after paying the $1 million). The
investor would receive a $3.25 million liquidation preference, meaning
that the investor's effective ownership in the company (32.5 percent) 156 is
greater than its stock ownership (25 percent). 157
149. For purposes of this illustration, assume that no dividends have accrued.
150. Thus, $2.5 million liquidation preference divided by $10 million.
151. Thus, two million shares issued to the investors divided by the eight million out-
standing post-money shares.
152. Thus, $1 million liquidation preference divided by $3 million.
153. Two million shares issued to the investors divided by the eight million outstanding
post-money shares.
154. See section II.A.2.c.] supra.
155. For purposes of this illustration, we assume that no dividends have accrued.
156. Thus, $3.25 million liquidation preference divided by $10 million.
157. Two million shares issued to the investors divided by the eight million outstanding
post-money shares.
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If, however, the company is sold for only $3 million soon after the in-
vestor's investment, the investor would receive, before any stockholder,
both (i) $1 million (the original investment), and (ii) $500,000 (25 percent
of $2 million remaining after paying the $1 million). The investor would
receive a $1.5 million payment, meaning that the investor's effective own-
ership in the company (50 percent) 58 is greater than its stock ownership
(25 percent). 159
(iii) Multiple of Investment Amount Liquidation Preference
An investor might obtain nonparticipating preferred stock that has a
liquidation preference that allows them to receive a certain multiple
(such as 150 percent, 200 percent, or some other multiple) of its original
investment amount (investment amount multiple). At the time the com-
pany liquidates, the company must pay to the investor, after the company
has paid its debts (but before it pays any amount to its other stockhold-
ers), an amount equal to the greater of either (i) a certain multiple of the
investor's original investment (e.g., 200 percent of $1 million) plus all ac-
crued and unpaid dividends (in this example, $80,000 per year); or (ii) his
pro rata share of the company's assets as if the investor had converted his
preferred stock to common stock immediately prior to the liquidation.
Assuming that the preferred stock has a 200 percent multiple, if the
company is sold for $10 million soon after the investor's investment, the
investor would receive, before any other stockholder, the greater of (i) $2
million (twice its original investment), 60 or (ii) $2.5 million (25 percent
of $10 million). If the investor elects to take the $2.5 million payment,
the investor's effective ownership in the company is 25 percent,161 the
same as its stock ownership. 162
However, if the company is sold for only $3 million soon after the in-
vestor's investment, the investor would receive, before any stockholder,
the greater of (i) $2 million (twice his original investment), 163 or (ii)
$750,000 (25 percent of $3 million). If the investor elects to take the $2
million payment, the investor's effective ownership in the company is 67
percent, 64 much greater that its stock ownership (which is 25 percent). 165
Note that an investor who wants the company to pay him a multiple of his
original investment amount before any other stockholder receives a share
effectively is telling the entrepreneur that the valuation of the company is
too high and it needs a mechanism (such as the investment amount multi-
158. Thus, $1.5 million liquidation preference divided by $3 million.
159. Two million shares issued to the investors divided by the eight million outstanding
post-money shares.
160. For purposes of this illustration, assume that no dividends have accrued.
161. Thus, $2.5 million liquidation preference divided by $10 million.
162. Two million shares issued to the investors divided by the eight million outstanding
post-money shares.
163. For purposes of this illustration, assume that no dividends have accrued.
164. Thus, $2 million liquidation preference divided by $3 million.
165. Two million shares issued to the investors divided by the eight million outstanding
post-money shares.
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pie) to lower the valuation. By obtaining $2 million for his $1 million
investment before any other stockholder receives any money, the inves-
tor effectively secures a $2 million pre-money valuation of the company
(instead of the $3 million pre-money valuation that the parties originally
negotiated).
In contrast, if the investor has participating preferred stock and the
company is sold for $10 million soon after the investor's investment, the
investor would receive, before any other stockholder, both (i) $2 million
(twice the original investment), and (ii) $2 million (25 percent of $8 mil-
lion that remains after paying the $2 million). Therefore, the investor
would receive a $4 million liquidation preference, meaning that the inves-
tor's effective ownership in the company is 40 percent, 166 which is higher
than his stock ownership of 25 percent. 167
If, however, the investor has participating preferred stock and the com-
pany is sold for $3 million soon after the investor's investment, the inves-
tor would receive, before any stockholder, both (i) $2 million (twice the
original investment), and (ii) $250,000 (25 percent of $1 million remaining
after paying the $2 million). That is, the investor would receive a $2.25
million payment, meaning that the investor's effective ownership in the
company is 75 percent, 168 far greater than his stock ownership of 25 per-
cent.169 This illustrates again how the investor used the investment
amount multiple to effectively lower the valuation of the company ($1.75
million pre-money valuation instead of the $3 million pre-money valua-
tion that the parties negotiated).
b. Dividend Rights
The foregoing examples of how a liquidation preference can cause an
investor's effective ownership to be greater than his stock ownership (and
effectively decrease a company's valuation) did not account for the 8 per-
cent annual dividend that accrued on the investor's $1 million investment
($80,000 per year). If we had accounted for this dividend, the investor's
effective ownership would have been even greater (and the company's
effective valuation would have been even lower). Consider the following
two examples:
Under the assumption that the investor has participating preferred
stock with a 200 percent multiple and the company is sold for $10 million
one year after the investor's investment, the investor would receive,
before any other stockholder, both (i) $2 million (twice his original in-
vestment) plus the $80,000 accrued dividend; and (ii) $1.98 million (25
percent of $7.92 million remaining after paying the $2.08 million). That
166. Thus, $4 million liquidation preference divided by $10 million.
167. Two million shares issued to the investors divided by the eight million outstanding
post-money shares.
168. Thus, $2.25 million liquidation preference divided by $3 million.
169. Two million shares issued to the investors divided by the eight million outstanding
post-money shares.
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is, the investor would receive a $4.06 million liquidation preference,
meaning that the investor's effective ownership in the company is 40.6
percent 17 (instead of 40 percent when the dividend is excluded).
Now assume that the investor has participating preferred stock with a
200 percent multiple and the company is sold for only $3 million one year
after the investor's investment, the investor would receive, before any
stockholder, both (i) $2 million (twice the original investment) plus the
$80,000 accrued dividend; and (ii) $230,000 (25 percent of $920,000 re-
maining after paying the $2.08 million). That is, the investor would re-
ceive a $2.31 million payment, meaning that the investor's effective
ownership in the company is 77 percent' 71 (instead of 75 percent when
the dividend is excluded).
c. Redemption rights
Recall that an investor with redemption rights may require the com-
pany to purchase his stock for cash at a specified price. 172 Redemption
rights may require the company to repay the investor's original invest-
ment plus accrued dividends, a multiple (e.g., 150 percent, 200 percent, or
other multiple) of the investor's original investment amount or the com-
pany's appraised value of the investor's stock. The effect of a redemption
right that is a multiple of the investor's original investment amount is
similar to that of the multiple of investment amount liquidation prefer-
ence discussed above, and may effectively lower the valuation of the
company.
d. Dilution Events
(i) Stock Options, Warrants, and Convertible Debt
In determining the investor's effective ownership in the company, the
entrepreneur must account not only for the stock that the company has
issued to the investor, but also for any rights that the company has issued
to its employees, consultants, investors, and creditors173 to obtain stock in
the company. These rights include stock options and warrants, which can
be exercised to obtain stock in the company, as well as convertible debt,
which investors can convert into equity in the company. As discussed in
section II.B below, Mexico generally does not permit stock options or
warrants, so the discussion below only applies to options and warrants in
a U.S. holding company.
Using the example set forth in footnotes 114-117, if the investor invests
$1 million into the company in return for 25 percent of the company (giv-
ing the company a $4 million post-money valuation), the entrepreneur
170. Thus, $4.06 million liquidation preference divided by $10 million.
171. Thus, $2.31 million liquidation preference divided by $3 million.
172. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 118-19.
173. In recent years, creditors, such as banks and lessors of real estate and equipment,
have required warrants as a condition to extending credit to (or doing business
with) a company.
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should ask the investor whether this includes or excludes any options,
warrants, convertible debt, and other rights that might be outstanding. If
the investor's offer includes the reservation of one million shares for con-
vertible debt (in addition to the six million outstanding pre-money
shares), then the investor is saying that there are in effect seven million
shares outstanding or reserved (not six million shares).17 4 Therefore, us-
ing the formulas set forth in the example above, the investor would be
entitled to receive 2,333,333 shares (not two million). 175
If the entrepreneur wants the one million reserved shares not to be
taken into account in the valuation, the company would issue just two
million shares (not 2,333,333) to the investor.t 76 In that case, the com-
pany's existing stockholders and the investor holding the two million new
shares will jointly bear the dilution for the one million reserved shares in
a ratio of 75/25, rather than having the company's existing stockholders
bear 100 percent of the dilution.1 77
(ii) Restricted Stock
As described above, restricted stock is equity that is subject to a vesting
schedule and a company can repurchase any unvested restricted stock if
the employee leaves the company or is terminated prematurely. Mexico
does not permit a private Mexican company to issue restricted stock
(since its repurchase constitutes an illegal redemption), so this section
only applies to a U.S. holding company. If the company repurchases un-
vested restricted stock from an employee, the ownership percentage of
the departing employee will decrease and each of the other stockholders
(including the investor) will increase proportionately.
(iii) Subsequent Financings
In negotiating the amount of equity that the company will sell in the
first round of equity financing, the entrepreneur should be aware that the
company may need to sell additional equity in one or more subsequent
rounds of financing, each of which will dilute the ownership percentage of
the entrepreneur and investor. If, however, an investor has a preemptive
right to purchase his pro rata share of any equity that the company issues
in the subsequent financing (thus allowing the investor to maintain his
ownership percentage in the company after the subsequent financing),
the entrepreneur and the company's other existing stockholders will suf-
fer 100 percent of the dilution resulting from such sale. Using the exam-
ple above, if the entrepreneur owns six million shares (75 percent) 178 of
174. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 200.
175. The total number of outstanding post-money shares is now 9,333,333. Seven mil-
lion outstanding pre-money shares/(1 minus 0.25), and the company will need to
issue 2,333,333 shares (9,333,333 outstanding post-money shares minus seven mil-
lion outstanding pre-money shares) to the investor.
176. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 200.
177. See id.
178. Six million shares divided by eight million shares.
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the company, the investor owns the remaining two million shares (25 per-
cent), 179 plus a preemptive right to buy his pro rata portion of any new
shares that the company issues, and the company wants to sell an addi-
tional two million shares to raise more money, the investor would have
the right to purchase 500,000 of these additional two million shares (thus
allowing the investor to maintain his 25 percent ownership interest in the
company), 180 but the entrepreneur's ownership percentage in the com-
pany would decrease from 75 percent to 60 percent. Although an entre-
preneur in a Mexican company has a preemptive right under Mexican law
that he cannot waive in advance, in practice, he will need to waive this
preemptive right in order to sell equity to the investor, thereby diluting
his ownership interest in the company. 18 1
e. Price Protection Rights
Recall that price protection anti-dilution rights protect investors
against the dilution of the price that they paid for their preferred stock by
adjusting the conversion price at which their preferred stock converts into
common stock. If the company issues equity in the future at a price less
than the investor's conversion price, price protection requires the com-
pany to adjust the investor's conversion price downward so that the inves-
tor obtains the benefit of such lower price when the investor converts his
preferred shares into common shares. 182 To illustrate, consider the effect
of price protection on the investor's ownership percentage in the com-
pany in each of the two examples below (one in which price protection is
not triggered and the other in which price protection is triggered). For
purposes of this illustration, assume that the company had a $3 million
pre-money valuation, the entrepreneur owns six million common shares,
the investor purchased two million shares of preferred stock for $1 mil-
lion ($0.50 per share), giving the company a $4 million post-money valua-
tion and giving the investor 25 percent of the company ($1 million
investment/$4 million post-money valuation or two million of the eight
million outstanding post-money shares).
(i) Price Protection Not Triggered
Assume that the company sold four million additional shares of pre-
ferred stock to a new fund for $4 million ($1.00 per share). The original
investor's ownership percentage in the company thus drops from 25 per-
cent to 16.67 percent (two million shares out of twelve million total), and
the value of the investor's investment increases from $1 million to $2 mil-
lion ($1.00/share multiplied by two million shares). The sale of additional
equity to the fund does not trigger the investor's price protection anti-
dilution rights.
179. Two million shares divided by eight million shares.
180. Thus, 2.5 million shares divided by a total of ten million shares.
181. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 132.
182. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 120, 213-14.
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(ii) Price Protection Triggered
Now assume that the company sold four million additional shares of
preferred stock to a new fund for $1 million ($0.25 per share). The inves-
tor's ownership percentage in the company thus drops from 25 percent to
16.67 percent (two million shares out of twelve million total), but the
value of the investor's investment decreases from $1 million to $500,000
($0.25/share multiplied by two million shares). The sale of additional eq-
uity to the fund triggers the investor's price protection anti-dilution
rights. The effect of such protection depends on whether the investor has
full ratchet or weighted average anti-dilution protection.
(a) Full Ratchet Anti-Dilution Protection
As discussed above, if the investor has full ratchet anti-dilution protec-
tion, the conversion price at which the preferred stock converts to com-
mon stock is reduced to the lower price at which the company sold stock
in the subsequent financing. Using our example above, assume that the
investor's original conversion price was 1:1, so that when the investor
converts his preferred stock to common stock, he still has 25 percent of
the company. Now assume that the investor's full ratchet anti-dilution
rights lowers the investor's conversion price from 1:1 to 1:2 (from
$0.50:$0.50 to $0.50:$0.25 per share), so that when the investor converts
its preferred stock to common stock, the company would issue four mil-
lion common shares to the investor for its two million preferred shares
(increasing the investor's ownership percentage from 16.67 percent to
28.5 percent).' 8 3
(b) Weighted Average Anti-Dilution Protection
If the investor has weighted average anti-dilution, the conversion price
at which the preferred stock converts to common stock is reduced to-
wards the lower price at which the company sold stock in the subsequent
financing. Using our example above, assume that the investor's weighted
average anti-dilution rights lowers the investor's conversion price from
1:1 to 1:1.2 (i.e., from $0.50:$0.50 to $0.50:$0.4167 per share), 184 so that
when the investor converts his preferred stock to common stock, the
company would issue 2.4 million common shares to the investor for his
two million preferred shares (increasing the investor's ownership percent-
age from 16.67 percent to 19.35 percent).1 85
183. This assumes that the entrepreneur has six million common shares, the investor
has four million common shares (after giving effect to its price protection), and the
fund has four million common shares, for a total of fourteen million outstanding
common shares. Four million shares divided by fourteen million shares = 28.5
percent.
184. $0.4167 = $0.50 x ((8 million + ($1 million / $0.50))/12 million). See the "weighted
average" formula in section A.2.c.5.b.2 supra.
185. This assumes that the entrepreneur has six million common shares, the investor
has 2.4 million common shares and the fund has four million common shares, for a
2003]
364 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 9
B. LIVING WITH PRIVATE EQUITY (CONTROL)
1. Corporate Governance
In light of the legal, economic, and political risks outlined above, inves-
tors sometimes take a majority or controlling stake in the company in
which they invest (especially family-owned businesses) in order to protect
their investment. As the head of a prominent private equity group notes,
"investing as a minority investor is a much bigger challenge than being
able to take a controlling stake." 186 Nevertheless, most investors elect to
take minority positions in their portfolio companies since majority con-
trol requires additional resources, management, and time. Majority con-
trol also diminishes the entrepreneur's incentive to grow the company.
Below are mechanisms that investors use to protect their minority posi-
tions in a U.S. and Mexican company.
a. Litigation
Perhaps the biggest protection that every stockholder of a U.S. com-
pany possesses is the ability to sue the company's directors for damages
that such stockholder suffers as a result of, among other things, a breach
of the fiduciary duty that each director owes to each stockholder of the
company as a matter of law and to sue third parties on behalf of the
company through stockholder derivative lawsuits and class action mecha-
nisms to enforce rights that the company itself does not enforce. 18 7 This
litigation threat, coupled by the relatively strong enforceability of U.S.
court judgments, generally encourages directors to respect minority
stockholders and subordinate their own individual interests to the best
interests of the company and its stockholders. In Mexico, however, this
threat is largely absent.' 88
b. Voting Agreements
To protect themselves against the majority stockholders, investors
holding minority positions in U.S. companies often require the major
stockholders to enter into an agreement to vote their shares to, among
other things, elect certain individuals (including the investor) to the com-
pany's board of directors and to force stockholders to sell their shares in
the company.
In Mexico, a voting agreement obligating stockholders to vote their
shares in a certain way is critical given that stockholders in a Mexican
company cannot waive their preemptive rights in advance (thus prevent-
ing the Mexican company from issuing future equity pursuant to, among
other things, stock options, warrants, anti-dilution rights, and registration
total of 12.4 million outstanding common shares. 2.4 million shares/12.4 million
shares = 19.35 percent.
186. See Kossick & Neckelmann, supra note 4, at 120.
187. See Fernandez et al., supra note 76, at 160.
188. See id. at 160.
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rights). Mexican law, however, zealously protects the voting rights of all
stockholders and thus does not allow stockholders in Mexican companies
to waive their right to vote or agree in advance to vote in a certain man-
ner. 89 Consequently, investors must find mechanisms other than voting
agreements to protect themselves against majority stockholders. One
such mechanism is to obligate the major stockholders of the Mexican
company to transfer their stock to a voting trust which a fiduciary (such
as a bank) manages and instruct the fiduciary to vote such stock in a
certain way. Unfortunately, voting trusts are expensive, time consuming,
and have their own risks.190
c. Board Representation
An investor in a U.S. company typically expects one or more seats on
the company's board of directors in order to better supervise the manage-
ment and operation of the company, to have access to the company's fi-
nancial and other confidential information, and to approve certain
fundamental corporate actions.' 91 Some investors may be content to at-
tend board meetings as observers who enjoy no right to vote. Many en-
trepreneurs, accustomed to unlimited control of the company, find such
oversight to be burdensome and restrictive, but the services, experience,
contacts, and resources that the investor brings to the company are sup-
posed to offset this burden.
The directors of Mexican companies do not hold the similar decision
189. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 198.
190. Enriquez, supra note 81, at 26.
191. In addition to those corporate actions that article 182 of the General Law of Busi-
ness Organizations reserves for approval by stockholders at an extraordinary
stockholders meeting (see infra note 199), below is a list of corporate actions that
investors often want to approve before the company takes such actions. The cor-
porate bylaws of the Mexican company can provide that such actions require ei-
ther a higher stockholder and/or board vote.
1. Variation of pre-established dividends policy;
2. Purchase, sale, transfer, exchange, or any other disposition of real estate or
fixed assets, whose value per item exceeds certain limits;
3. Mortgage or encumbrance of real estate;
4. Obtaining credits, loans, or other financing in excess of certain limits;
5. Granting credits other than in the ordinary course of business;
6. Acting as guarantor or surety for third parties;
7. The execution, amendment, termination, or assignment of contracts or
agreements for obtaining or rendering administrative, financial, and other
management services, technical assistance, or for the use and exploitation of
copyrights, patents, trademarks, or commercial names, other than in the or-
dinary course of business
8. Remuneration of directors, officers, and executives;
9. Determination of product lines and scope of business activities;
10. The waiver of any real or personal rights of the company;
11. The appointment and removal of general attorneys-in-fact;
12. Investment in other Mexican entities; and
13. Transactions with persons or entities related to or controlled by sharehold-
ers, directors, or employees.
See Fernandez et al., supra note 76, 172-74.
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power that directors hold in a U.S. company. 92 That is, stockholders in
Mexican companies exert more influence on directors than stockholders
in U.S. companies exert on their directors because the supreme powers in
a Mexican company reside in the stockholders meetings.193 Moreover,
Mexican law accords considerably more rights to majority stockholders,
thereby limiting the minority stockholder's influence over the company's
management unless the company's bylaws provide additional protection
to the minority stockholder. 194
To induce entrepreneurs to reach certain goals, some investors require
the entrepreneur to relinquish board control (or board seats) if such goals
are not met. In Mexico, agreements allowing investors to take over
boards are limited and impractical to enforce.1 95 Stockholders elect
board members of a Mexican company at stockholders meetings, and the
vote of stockholders cannot be controlled through a stockholder voting
agreement. 196 In addition, some grounds that may give rise to triggering
a board takeover such as a refusal and/or inability to redeem stock are
not allowed under Mexican law.197
d. Veto Rights
Another way that investors in both U.S. and Mexican companies pro-
tect themselves against the majority is to obtain the right to approve (or
veto) certain fundamental actions that the company may take. 198 A com-
pany may grant an effective veto right to an investor by (i) listing in the
company's organizational documents or in a stockholder agreement199
the specific corporate actions that the investor (either as a director or a
192. See Fernandez et al., supra note 76, at 163.
193. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 178.
194. See Fernandez et al., supra note 76, at 163.
195. Besides voting trusts, another way that investors sometimes achieve an effective
board takeover and/or replacement of members in a Mexican company is to struc-
ture the resolution adopted at a stockholders meeting designating the initial board
members and include therein a proviso establishing certain minimum financial
milestones for members to continue; if not, their resignation will be automatic,
without the need of a stockholders meeting. To avoid a stockholders' voting
agreement, such initial resolution must designate the names of alternate members
who would take office effective upon resignation of the initial members. The
downside of this structure is the weak enforcement mechanism of the judiciary and
that alternate members must be designated well in advance. The latter is a process
that may not produce the best results when trying to find talent. If no previous
designation of alternate members is resolved, then the stockholders must call for a
stockholders' meeting to designate substitute members, which may eventually re-
sult in a different board composition than the one desired, and the minority stock-
holders will always be able to exercise statutory board member designation rights.
196. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 198.
197. See section A.2.c.3 supra.
198. See supra note 190 and infra note 199 listing corporate actions that investors often
want to approve before the company takes such actions.
199. In Mexico, investors may list the matters that require their specific approval (that
is, their veto rights) in the company's organizational documents (such as bylaws
(estatutos)) in a Mexican company, certificate (or articles) of incorporation in a
U.S. company or in a stockholders' agreement. Most practitioners in Mexico rec-
ommend listing such matters in the company's bylaws.
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stockholder) must personally approve; (ii) requiring the company to ob-
tain a super-majority stockholder vote (such as 80 percent) in order to
take any important corporate action; or (iii) granting the investor a class
of stock (such as preferred stock) that is different from the stock that the
majority holds (common stock) and then requiring the company to obtain
the consent of the holders of such separate class of stock to approve spe-
cific corporate actions. Note that Mexican law provides a list of corpo-
rate actions that must be decided at an extraordinary shareholders'
meeting.2 00 A Mexican company cannot take any action that adversely
affects a particular class of stock without the approval of a majority of the
stockholders in such separate class. 20 1
e. Other Minority Rights under Mexican Law
Below is a brief description of Mexican statutory provisions that ad-
dress the rights of minority stockholders in Mexican companies. Without
the additional protections described above, however, note how these pro-
visions generally do little to protect a stockholder (i.e., an investor) who
holds, say, 20 percent of the Mexican company's stock.
(i) Stockholder Meetings
(a) Calling Stockholders' Meetings
Any stockholder (or group of stockholders) holding at least 33 percent
of the capital stock of a Mexican company may, at any time, call a stock-
holders meeting. The same right is available to the holder of at least one
share of capital stock if (i) no stockholders meeting has been held for at
least two years, or (ii) such meetings have not dealt with the matters to be
compulsorily addressed by an annual general ordinary stockholders meet-
ing (i.e., approval of financial statements, appointment and removal of
managers, etc.).2 2
200. Article 182 of the General Law of Business Organizations reserves the following
actions for approval by stockholders at an extraordinary stockholders meeting:
1. Extension of the duration of the company;
2. Dissolution of the company prior to the term established in its charter and
bylaws;
3. Increases and decreases of the company's capital stock;
4. Change in the corporate purpose of the company;
5. Change of nationality of the company;
6. Transformation of the company;
7. Merger of the company with another company;
8. Issuance of special shares;
9. Redemption by the company of its own shares and issuance of redeemable
stock;
10. Issuance of bonds;
11. Any amendments to the charter and bylaws of the company: and
12. Any other issues that requires a special quorum in accordance with this
charter and bylaws or the General Law of Business Organizations.
201. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 195.
202. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, arts. 184, 185. See
Fernandez et al., supra note 76, at 164.
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(b) Quoruns
Two types of stockholder meetings exist under Mexican law: (i) an or-
dinary stockholder meeting,20 3 and (ii) an extraordinary stockholder
meeting. 20 4 A quorum at an ordinary stockholder's meeting called for
the first time requires the presence of at least 50 percent of the company's
capital unless the company's bylaws state otherwise. 205 If no quorum is
reached at the first call those present at the second call, regardless of
their number, will constitute a quorum. 20 6 In contrast, a quorum at an
extraordinary stockholder's meeting called for the first time requires the
presence of at least 75 percent of the company's capital and 51 percent of
the company's capital at the second call. 20 7
(c) Voting
A majority of the shares present at an ordinary stockholder's meeting
is required to approve a resolution at such meeting, whereas a majority of
the total voting stock of the company is required to approve a resolution
at an extraordinary stockholder's meeting.20 8
(d) Veto Rights at Special Stockholders' Meetings
In Mexican companies with different classes of stock (e.g., preferred
shares or limited voting shares), any proposal that may affect the rights of
any such class must be previously approved by the holders of such class in
their own special stockholders meeting. The attendance quorum and vot-
ing percentages applicable to special stockholders meetings are the same
as those required for the adoption of changes to the company's bylaws,
which shall be computed taking into account only the shares belonging to
the category being affected.209
(e) Postponing Vote in a Stockholders' Meetings
Any stockholder (or group of stockholders) holding at least 33 percent
of the capital stock of a Mexican company may postpone, for three days,
the vote on any resolution or authorization on any matter which such
stockholders considers to be not sufficiently informed. This right may
only be exercised once for each matter listed in the agenda of a general
203. An ordinary stockholders' meeting must be held annually and will address matters
not specifically reserved for extraordinary meetings. See General Law of Business
Organizations, supra note 58, arts. 179, 181.
204. An extraordinary stockholder's meeting is held to address any proposals that the
General Law of Business Organizations or the bylaws of the company specifically
reserve for such meetings. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note
58, arts. 179, 182; see supra note 199.
205. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 189; Fernandez et
al., supra note 76, at 165.
206. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 191.
207. See id. arts. 190-191.
208. See id. arts. 189-191.
209. See id. art. 195.
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stockholders meeting.210
(ii) Challenging Stockholder Resolutions
(a) Challenges by Stockholders Holding 33 Percent or More
Any stockholder (or group of stockholders) holding at least 33 percent
of the capital stock of a Mexican company may request a court to vacate
any resolution adopted by a general stockholders meeting.21' With this
action, the stockholders may obtain the provisional suspension, pending
final judgment, of the challenged resolution. This action may not be filed
against resolutions dealing with the liability of managers or statutory
examiners. 21 2
(b) Challenges by Stockholders Holding Less Than 33 Percent
Any stockholder holding one or more shares of capital stock of a Mexi-
can company may request any court to vacate any resolution adopted in
violation of the company's bylaws or the law, with no statute of limita-
tions applicable to initiate such action. However, in this case, the resolu-
tion being challenged may not be suspended other than through final
judgment (which may not occur for several years). 213
(c) Challenges by Holders of Special Shares
Holders of limited voting shares, irrespective of the percentage of stock
held, shall have the same rights to oppose resolutions adopted on general
stockholder meetings granted to stockholders representing at least 33
percent of the capital stock of a Mexican company. Such stockholders
may also request the financial statements and corporate books of the
company for revision.2 14
(iii) Internal Management
(a) Examining Books and Records
Mexican law requires Mexican companies to disclose balance sheets
and other financial information to stockholders before an ordinary stock-
holder's meeting.2 15
(b) Information Rights of Holders of Special Shares
Holders of limiting voting shares, irrespective of the percentage of
stocks held, may also request the financial statements and corporate
books of the company for revision.21 6
210. See id. art. 199.
211. See id. art. 201.
212. See id.
213. See Federal Civil Code (Codigo Civil Federal), arts. 2224 et al.
214. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, arts. 112, 201.
215. See id. arts. 172-173.
216. See id. art. 113.
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(c) Appointment and Removal of Directors and Statutory
Examiners
Any stockholder (or group of stockholders) holding at least 25 percent
of the shares of common stock of a Mexican company (or at least 10
percent if the company is publicly traded) may appoint at least one mem-
ber of the board of directors (provided the board has at least three mem-
bers)2 17 and statutory examiners (comisarios).218
(iv) Economic Rights
(a) Liability Claim by Minority Stockholders
Any stockholder (or group of stockholders) holding at least 33 percent
of the capital stock of a Mexican company may initiate a claim for civil
liability against the company's managers if: (i) the action comprises all
damages caused to the company and not only those caused to the plain-
tiffs, and (ii) the plaintiffs did not vote in favor of a stockholders' resolu-
tion releasing managers and statutory examiners from liability. Any
damages recovered shall benefit the company and not the plaintiff
directly. 219
(b) Right of Withdrawal
When a general stockholders meeting adopts a resolution regarding (i)
the change of corporate purpose; (ii) change of nationality; or (iii) trans-
formation of the corporate form, any stockholder who voted against such
resolution may withdraw from the Mexican company and may request
the redemption of its shares at book value, provided such request is made
within fifteen days following the date of the corresponding general stock-
holders meeting.220 This right of withdrawal may not be exercised when
it has the effect of reducing the Mexican company's capital below the
minimum allowed by applicable law. 221
(c) Dividend, Preemptive and Liquidation Rights
Each stockholder of a Mexican company has the dividend, preemptive,
and liquidation rights previously discussed above, which cannot be
waived.
Note that recent legislative developments 222 applicable to companies
listed on the Mexican stock exchange (Bolsa Mexicana de Valores) have
modified the requirements for minority stockholders to achieve statutory
protection. For instance, appointment and removal of directors and stat-
utory examiners, and the request for the call of a stockholders meeting
217. See id. art. 144.
218. See id. art. 171.
219. See id. art. 163.
220. See id. art. 206.
221. See id. arts. 220-221.
222. These developments were introduced via amendments to the Law of Securities
Markets.
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requires a share ownership of 10 percent, rather than 25 percent or 33
percent, of the Mexican company's capital stock. These amendments are
steps in the right direction, but really do not address the concerns of pri-
vate equity investors, who usually target non-public companies rather
than companies with shares traded on stock exchanges.
2. Stock Transfer Restrictions
In the United States, investors generally require the entrepreneur and
other key stockholders of the company to sign a stock restriction agree-
ment (also called a stockholders agreement or share retention agree-
ment) to prevent them from transferring their shares to any third party
except in limited circumstances. Typical exceptions allow a stockholder
to transfer stock to family members and business affiliates freely and also
to third parties once the transferring stockholder has allowed the investor
an opportunity to buy the stock first (see right of first refusal and right of
first offer sections below). Likewise, entrepreneurs should consider sub-
jecting investors to similar stock restrictions, but most investors resist
such restrictions given that they seek to sell their investment in the com-
pany within three to five years. The purpose of the stock restriction
agreement is to keep the ownership of the company with those that are
directly involved in the success of the business, to provide liquidity to
investors in certain situations, and to maintain the balance of power
among stockholders. 223
Stock restriction agreements are uncommon in Mexico. Moreover, al-
though Mexican law allows agreements that restrict the sale of property
(such as stock) to a specified third party, agreements preventing the sale
of property to any party are null and void. 224 Thus, the enforcement of
stock restriction agreements in Mexico may be tricky.
a. Right of First Refusal
If a stockholder subject to a stock restriction agreement (such as the
entrepreneur) receives (and wants to accept) an offer from a third party
to buy his stock, a right of first refusal requires such stockholder to first
offer to sell his stock to other stockholders (such as the investors) first on
the same terms offered by the third party. If such offerees refuse the
selling stockholder's offer, the selling stockholder can then sell his stock
to the third party, subject to the co-sale (tag along) rights described be-
low. If the offerees buy some, but not all of the selling stockholder's
stock, the third party may not want to buy such shares. For this reason,
an entrepreneur should require any stockholder to whom he gives a right
of first refusal to buy all (not just some) of his stock as a condition to
exercising the right of first refusal.
223. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 92.
224. Federal Civil Code, supra note 213, art. 2301.
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b. Right of First Offer
If a stockholder subject to a stock restriction agreement (such as the
entrepreneur) wants to sell his stock to a third party (but has not received
any third party offer yet), a right of first offer requires such stockholder
to offer to sell his stock to other stockholders (or the company itself) and
allow such offerees the opportunity to make the first offer to purchase
such stock. Again, an entrepreneur should require any stockholder to
whom he gives a right of first offer to buy all (and not just some) of his
stock as a condition to exercising the right of first offer.
In the United States, rights of first refusal and rights of first offer gen-
erally are contained in a stock restriction agreement between the com-
pany and the major stockholders of the company. In Mexico, these rights
may be included either in the company's bylaws or in a stockholders'
agreement, although placing such rights in the bylaws may make them
easier to enforce. Both the right of first offer and right of first refusal are
known in Mexico as the derecho del tanto, which is mandatory (in other
words, cannot be waived in advance) for certain types of companies (such
as limited liability companies (sociedad de responsibilidad limitada), but
not other types of companies (such as sociedad anonima). With respect
to capital stock companies, Mexican law permits bylaws to provide that
any share transfer requires the approval of the board of directors and the
board may deny the approval only if it designates a buyer for the shares
at market price. 225
In those industries where Mexican foreign investment laws limit the
investor's ability to acquire additional shares pursuant to their rights of
first refusal or first offer,226 an alternative is to grant the investor the right
to designate a qualified designee to purchase the shares or even the right
to have the shares placed in trust until an acceptable buyer is found.
3. Incentives
Investors seek to maximize returns on their investment by using both
carrots and sticks to motivate the company's employees to work hard and
efficiently. Below are some of the incentives that investors and entrepre-
neurs use to motivate their workforce.
a. Stock Options and Warrants
As discussed above, U.S. companies routinely use stock options to at-
tract and retain key employees and consultants, and use warrants induc-
ing investors in the company or third party business. 227 That is,
companies use the vesting schedule on a stock option to motivate em-
225. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 130.
226. See section I.D.2.f supra (Regulatory Obstacles - Limits to Foreign Investment).
227. Stock options have the dual purpose of rewarding the employee by allowing him to
participate in any increase in the value of the company and ensuring that the em-
ployee stays with the company for a certain period of time in order to get such
profits. See Morrison & Foerster, supra note 3, at 7.
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ployees to continue to work for the company by allowing them to
purchase more and more stock at favorable prices as their stock options
vest over time. In contrast, companies often issue warrants as a "sweet-
ener" to induce investors to make loans or to lower the price at which
they purchase equity and to induce third parties, such as banks, lessors,
and strategic partners to do business with the company.
Mexico's current legal framework, however, does not allow a Mexican
company to issue such rights. First, if stockholders of a Mexican company
can waive their preemptive rights only when the company issues new
stock, the Mexican company cannot grant options to acquire its stock in
the future unless existing stockholders waive their preemptive rights at
the time the option holder exercises such option (which may or may not
occur). This leaves employees and investors in a position of legal
uncertainty.
Second, even if stockholders of Mexican companies could waive their
preemptive rights in advance, Mexican law limits the ability of Mexican
companies to hold unsubscribed stock to issue upon the occurrence of a
future event, thereby preventing the use of stock options, warrants, and
similar rights. To illustrate, a U.S. company may authorize the creation of
a pool of shares which have not been issued and subscribed for but which
can be issued and subscribed for in the future upon the occurrence of
some event (such unissued and unsubscribed shares are referred to as
authorized unissued shares). 228 Similarly, a U.S. company can issue
shares to its stockholders and subsequently reacquire these shares to hold
or re-issue in the future (such issued but not outstanding shares are re-
ferred to as treasury shares). When a stockholder or an investor exercises
a stock option or warrant (or converts his convertible note into stock),
the U.S. company will issue either authorized unissued shares or treasury
shares to such stockholder or investor.
Mexican law, however, prohibits authorized unissued shares, thus a
Mexican company may issue only the stock that will be subscribed and
paid for.229 A Mexican company cannot issue new shares unless prior
issuances are completely subscribed and paid for. 23° Moreover, a Mexi-
can company generally cannot hold treasury shares except in limited
cases.23' Without authorized unissued shares and treasury shares, a Mex-
ican company cannot issue stock options or warrants.
Based on these limitations, the most common way for the entrepre-
neur, investors, and others to obtain stock options, warrants, and similar
rights is to form a U.S. holding company or other offshore company,
which may also bring about other benefits as well as additional costs.
228. For example, upon the exercise of a stock option or warrant.
229. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 133.
230. See id.
231. See Securities Market Law, supra note 131, art. 81 (requires stockholders of a Mex-
ican public company to waive their preemptive rights (derecho de preferencia) in a
public offering in order to create a pool of treasury shares that the Mexican com-
pany can sell to the public from time to time).
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b. Restricted Stock
As discussed above, restricted stock is equity that an employee 232 actu-
ally owns in the company but which the company can repurchase from
the employee if he or she leaves the company or is terminated prema-
turely. To motivate the employee to work for the company over a certain
period of time (such as four years), the company and employee sign a
restricted stock agreement (not a stock restriction agreement as discussed
above) that subjects the employee's shares to a vesting schedule. 2 33 If the
employee leaves or is terminated before his or her stock fully vests, the
company can repurchase the unvested portion of the shares, thus discour-
aging the employee from leaving the company.
Since Mexican law generally does not allow redemptions, a Mexican
company cannot repurchase any stock of an employee who leaves the
company or is terminated prematurely. Mexican law does allow, how-
ever, for a Mexican company's charter and bylaws to provide for the issu-
ance of special shares 234 to persons providing services to the Mexican
company, including employees. Limited circulation and non-transferabil-
ity characterize special shares. Unfortunately, the Mexican company may
not repurchase these shares if an employee leaves the company or is ter-
minated prematurely, given the express prohibition against redemption in
private companies. Once issued and subscribed, special shares belong un-
conditionally to their holders. These particularities of Mexican corporate
law complicate the elaboration of a vesting schedule designed to reward
the loyalty and productivity of a Mexican company's employees, reducing
the ability of the entrepreneur and investors to encourage employees to
continue to work for the Mexican company.
C. EXIT FROM INVESTMENT
As mentioned above, investors seek to sell their investment in the com-
pany within three to five years after the date of such investment in order
to return the sale proceeds to the fund investors within the life of the
fund. An investor generally expects to sell his investment in the company
either through a private sale to third party, redemption, private sale to
stockholder, or a public sale, 235 each of which is discussed below in the
context of a U.S. holding company and Mexican company.
1. Private Sale to Third Party
a. Company Sale
The most common exit strategy in Mexico and throughout Latin
232. Investors often require entrepreneurs to hold restricted stock so that the entrepre-
neur will have an incentive to continue to work for the company for a period of
time.
233. See HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 6-3.
234. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 114.
235. See Alers et al., supra note 37, at 7-19.
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America is for a third party to purchase the assets or stock236 of the com-
pany in a private sale (company sale). After the NASDAQ crash in 2000,
the company sale has also become the most common exit strategy in the
United States. A company sale sometimes is called a trade sale or strate-
gic sale. The buyer in a company sale often is a strategic buyer that is
either a larger local company that wants to expand its market share or a
foreign company interested in entering the local market. A report called
"Latin America Private Equity Review & Outlook 2000/2001" establishes
that thirteen out of fifteen exits registered in Latin America were carried
out through a sale of the company. 237 Two contractual rights often asso-
ciated with company sales, drag-along rights and tag-along rights, are per-
mitted in Mexico and are discussed below.
b. Drag-Along Rights
When a third party offers to buy the stock of the company's sharehold-
ers, some shareholders might not want to sell their stock, thereby
preventing the third party purchaser from acquiring all (or a certain per-
centage) of the company's equity. To prevent this from happening, inves-
tors use drag-along rights to require other stockholders (such as the
entrepreneur and other key stockholders) to sell their shares to the third
party purchaser on the same terms offered to (or negotiated by) the in-
vestor or majority stockholders. Drag-along rights allow investors to
force (in other words, drag-along) uncooperative stockholders (such as
the entrepreneur and key employees) to sell their shares to the third
party purchaser. One of the issues that funds consider when deciding
whether to invest in a company is whether such a company would be
attractive to a third party purchaser. If the entrepreneur opposes the pos-
sibility of such a sale (a factor that should be discussed with the fund) the
company may not be suitable for private equity financing. Mexico allows
drag-along rights, which generally are included in a stockholders' agree-
ment among the stockholders of the Mexican company.
c. Co-Sale (Tag-Along) Rights
In some cases, a third party offers to buy the shares of the majority
stockholders (such as the entrepreneur and key employees) but not
others (such as the investor), thereby causing the excluded stockholders
to live with new stockholders (a competitor) after such sale. To prevent
this from happening, an investor uses co-sale rights (also called tag-along
rights) to allow the investor to tag-along in the sale and sell a pro rata
portion (or all) of his shares to the purchaser on the same terms and
conditions of the offer. This provision aligns the interests of all possible
selling stockholders and discourages competition among them for the sale
of shares to potential buyers. Co-sale rights may be applicable to the sale
236. A third party can acquire the company's stock either by purchasing it indirectly
from the Company through a merger or directly from the stockholders themselves.
237. See Morrison & Foerster, supra note 3, at 12.
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of the majority or minority of shares. If tag-along rights are only trig-
gered upon the sale of the majority of the outstanding shares, such right
prevents a third party from offering to purchase from the majority stock-
holders at a premium price only that number of shares sufficient to obtain
a majority of the board of directors. 238 Co-sale rights also serve as a de-
fensive mechanism for a fund to avoid being placed in a situation where
the fund must maintain an investment while the entrepreneurs withdraw
from the company. Mexico allows co-sale rights, which generally are in-
cluded in a stockholders agreement among the stockholders of the Mexi-
can company.
2. Private Sale to Issuer (Redemption)
a. Put and Call Options
As discussed in section II.A.2 above, a put option (voluntary redemp-
tion right) allows the investor to require the company to redeem its stock
for cash at a specified time and price.239 An investor typically does not
exercise his put option unless he otherwise cannot exit from his invest-
ment. In contrast, a call option (i.e., an involuntary redemption right)
allows the company to redeem the investor's stock for a specific price
upon the occurrence of a certain event. 2411 In the United States, private
companies generally may redeem their shares except in certain cases
(such as the redemption defrauds creditors). Mexican law, however, spe-
cifically prohibits private Mexican companies from redeeming their
shareholders stock unless it is judicially ordered for the purpose of satis-
fying credit obligations. 241
Investors may seek alternatives to achieve redemption by setting aside
a certain percentage of shares in escrow, using a trust vehicle, or forming
an offshore holding company (such as a U.S. holding company).
b. Convertible Debt
Before the investor converts his convertible note into equity, the inves-
tor has two advantages: (i) the investor can exit from his investment by
requiring the company to repay the principal and interest owing on the
note; and (ii) upon liquidation, the company must pay the convertible
loan before paying any stockholders. Of course, once the investor con-
verts his note into equity, the investor must rely on the other exit mecha-
nisms discussed herein.242
238. See Mayer, Brown & Platt, supra note 13, at 16.
239. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 118-19.
240. See id.
241. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 134. See Morrison
& Foerster, supra note 3, at 5. See also supra text accompanying notes 220-221.
242. See Alers et al., supra note 37, at 13.
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3. Private Sale to Stockholder
a. Negotiated Sale
Another way that investors exit from their investment is to sell their
shares to one or more stockholders in the company. The investor can do
this simply by negotiating the terms of the sale at the time that the inves-
tor wants to exit. The problem with this approach, however, is that it
depends on, among other variables, whether (i) the investor has sufficient
equity ownership in the company to attract another stockholder to buy it;
(ii) other stockholders have the financial ability to purchase the investor's
shares; and (iii) other stockholders will pay a fair price for such shares.
Thus, the prudent investor will recognize that a negotiated sale is an op-
tion but will not rely solely on this mechanism to exit from its
investment.243
b. Third-Party Put Options
To secure his exit when the investment is made, the prudent investor
may negotiate a third party put option, allowing the investor to require
another stockholder to purchase the investor's shares at a specified time
and price. 244 Of course, the crux of these negotiations is determining the
time and price at which the investor can "put" his shares to another
stockholder.
c. Third Party Call Option
A stockholder might agree to be obligated to buy the investor's shares
pursuant to a third party put option in exchange for a third party call
option that allows such stockholder to require the investor to sell his
shares to the stockholder at a certain time and price. Conversely, an in-
vestor may negotiate a third party call option that allows the investor to
require another stockholder (such as the entrepreneur) to sell his shares
to the investor at a certain price, thus giving the investor greater control
of the company. Again, the crux of such negotiations is determining the
time and price at which one stockholder can "call" the shares of another.
d. Buy-Sell Option
A buy-sell option incorporates the third party put and call options into
one mechanism. That is, a buy-sell option gives a stockholder (such as
the investor) the right to give another stockholder (e.g., the entrepre-
neur) an offer either to (i) buy a certain amount of the other stock-
holder's shares for a specific price, or (ii) sell a certain amount of his own
shares to the other stockholder for a specific price. The stockholder re-
ceiving the offer then must either sell his own shares or buy the stock of
the offering stockholder in accordance with the terms of his offer.
243. See id. at 11.
244. See id. at 9.
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4. Public Sale
a. Types of Offerings
A Mexican company may sell its stock to the general public by listing
its shares directly on the Mexican stock exchange (Bolsa Mexicana de
Valores or BMV), directly on a U.S. stock exchange, 245 on NASDAQ, or
in the over-the-counter (OTC) or "pink sheet" market, or in the form of
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) on a U.S. stock exchange, on
NASDAQ, or in an OTC market. In the alternative, a Mexican company
can form a U.S. holding company, which in turn sells its stock to the gen-
eral public by listing its shares directly on a U.S. stock exchange, on NAS-
DAQ, or in an OTC market. We outline below public sales through
direct offerings on the BMV or U.S. public markets and through the use
of ADRs.
(i) Direct Offering
(a) Mexican Direct Offering
The BMV does not currently offer entrepreneurs and investors a viable
exit opportunity for their stock in a Mexican company. 246 The BMV is
small,247 thinly traded,248 and generally available only to a handful of top-
tier industrial conglomerates, not unknown companies with relatively
short performance records. 249 The BMV also has suffered some scandals
that have reduced investor confidence (such as unrestricted insider trad-
ing that caused prices to fully incorporate the information before its pub-
lic release). 250 Moreover, OTC trading is almost non-existent in Mexico.
The lack of a public market in Mexico reduces the willingness of investors
to make private equity investments directly in Mexican companies. How-
ever, the Securities Market Law was amended on June 1, 2001 to include
a provision under Article 14 Bis-1 that allows companies to register their
securities in the Securities Section of the National Securities Registry
(Secci6n de Valores del Registro Nacional de Valores), without a public
offering, by requesting authorization from the CNBV. Such registration
must comply with the registration terms of Article 14 (applicable for re-
gistration for public offerings), provided, however, that a detailed bro-
chure (substituting the public offering prospectus) must describe all the
245. For example, the New York Stock Exchange or American Stock Exchange.
246. See Morrison & Foerster, supra note 3, at 11; Kossick & Neckelmann, supra note 4,
at 114-15.
247. The BMV is a minor player among the world's stock markets, listing only 177
companies as of December 2000. See Roberto Charvel & Juan Carlos de Yeregui,
Private Equity in Latin America: The Mexican Case, 6 J. PRIVATE EQuiTY 1 (2002).
248. See id. Of the few public offerings on the BMV, the shares of many listed compa-
nies are never traded again.
249. See Kossick & Neckelmann, supra note 4, at 115; Anthony M. Vernava, Latin
American Finance: A Financial, Economic and Legal Synopsis of Debt Swaps,
Privatizations, Foreign Direct Investment Law Revisions and International Securi-
ties Issues, 15 WIs. INT'L L.J. 89, 123 (1996).
250. Utpal Bhattacharya et al., When an Event is not an Event: The Curious Case of an
Emerging Market, 55 J. FIN. ECON. 69 (1999).
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information requested in Article 14, numeral I (letter a) (e.g., a legal
opinion regarding the standing of the issuer; audited financial statements,
etc.). 251 Finally, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit published in
2002 the Rules Applicable to Certain Acquisitions of Securities and
Tender Offers (Reglas Generales aplicables a las Adquisiciones de Valores
que deban ser Reveladas y de Ofertas Pliblicas de Compra de
Valores),252which seek to enhance transparency and protect minority
shareholders deriving from tender offers and transactions involving inside
stockholders.
(b) U.S. Direct Offering
The U.S. capital market is one of the most attractive sources of financ-
ing to foreign companies because its sheer size offers unparalleled liquid-
ity, an enormous array of financial service providers meet diverse
corporate finance needs, and U.S. investors often are more receptive and
have a better understanding of companies than investors in the local mar-
ket. During the internet craze of the late 1990s, a number of private eq-
uity supported Latin American companies sold shares through the U.S.
public markets.253 Unfortunately, companies (whether Mexican or U.S.)
that seek to sell stock in U.S. public markets subject themselves to U.S.
disclosure requirements, accounting standards, legal liability, and other
factors that impose significant costs and burdens on the company.
(ii) American Depository Receipts (ADRs)
In addition to a direct offering, a Mexican company seeking to access
U.S. public markets can list its ADRs on a U.S. stock exchange, such as
NASDAQ, or in an OTC market. ADRs are securities issued by a U.S.
bank that represent the Mexican company's ordinary shares held in cus-
tody by that bank. The amount of access that a Mexican company gets to
the U.S public markets depends on the type of ADR program that it cre-
ates. If the Mexican company wants to access the highly liquid U.S. pub-
lic markets, it can create a Level III ADR program in which the company
lists its ADRs on an exchange or NASDAQ as part of a public offering,
thus subjecting itself to the full disclosure requirements, accounting stan-
dards, and legal liability of U.S. federal securities laws.254 However, if
251. See Securities Market Law, supra note 131, arts. 14 and 14 bis.
252. See Rules Applicable to Certain Acquisitions of Securities and Tender Offers
(Reglas Generates aplicables a las Adquisiciones de Valores que deban ser Reve-
ladas y de Ofertas Ptiblicas de Compra de Valore), published in the Federation's
Official Gazette , Apr. 25, 2002).
253. Terra Networks, S.A. (a Latin American internet company), El Sitio.com (an Ar-
gentine-based internet portal), lmpsat (an Argentine internet infrastructure com-
pany), and StarMedia Networks, Inc. (a Latin American internet portal) listed
their shares on NASDAQ, the active second tier market in the U.S. See Kossick &
Neckelmann, supra note 4, at 115-16. See Mailander, supra note 5, at 75.
254. See Mailander, supra note 5, at 75, 81; Mark A. Saunders, American Depositary
Receipts: An Introduction to U.S. Capital Markets for Foreign Companies, 17
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 48, 50 (1993).
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the Mexican company wants to provide a market for its shares that is
more cost-effective and less burdensome from a disclosure, accounting
and liability perspective, it can create a Level I ADR program in which
the company trades its ADRs in the less liquid OTC markets. 255 As of
the date of this writing, twenty-one of the twenty-four Mexican compa-
nies listed on the New York Stock Exchange are listed in the form of
ADRs. 256 Further, two of the three Mexican companies listed on NAS-
DAQ are listed as ADRs. 257
b. Registration Rights
Registration rights give the stockholders who have them the right to
require the company to register their stock under applicable securities
laws so that the stockholders can sell their stock to the general public in a
public offering. 258 Investors typically request three types of registration
rights: demand rights, short-form rights, and piggyback rights.
(i) Demand Rights
A demand registration right is a right to demand that the company file
a long-form registration statement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on Form S-1 (U.S. holding company making a public
offering of its stock in the United States) or Form F-1 (Mexican company
making a public offering of its stock in the United States). 259 A long-
form registration statement is used by a company that is not yet subject to
the periodic reporting requirements of U.S. securities laws, or alterna-
tively, is subject to such reporting requirements but is not eligible to use
the simpler short-form registration statements 60 Generally, an investor
group will receive only one or two demand rights, with limits on when the
rights can be exercised. 261
In Mexico, however, registration rights are not contemplated in the
law. To the extent that a registration right requires a voting agreement
among stockholders to approve an increase in the Mexican company's
capital to make a public offering and an advance waiver of each stock-
holder's preemptive rights, such registration rights would be illegal. A
provision could be included in the company's bylaws, however, that pro-
vides that the corporate purpose of the Mexican company is to become
public when certain financial milestones are achieved and that the board
of directors of the company is authorized to adopt a resolution to such
effect. In addition to enforceability problems, such provisions require
255. See Mailander, supra note 5, at 75, 81; see Saunders, supra note 254, at 50.
256. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 476 COMPANIES FROM 51 COUNTRIES, at http://
www.nyse.com/pdfs/forlist03O3O6.pdf (Mar. 5, 2003).
257. See NASDAQ, INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES, at http://www.nasdaq.com (Mar. 28,
2003).
258. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 222; Alers et al., supra note 37, at 16-17.
259. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 222; see Mailander, supra note 5, at 77.
260. See Mailander, supra note 5, at 77.
261. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 223; see Mailander, supra note 5, at 77.
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language that may not satisfy the Mexican company's needs or the re-
quirements of the Banking and Securities National Commission (Comis-
ion Nacional Bancaria y de Valores) when going public.
(ii) Short-Form Rights
A short-form registration right is another type of demand right that
allows the investor to require the company to register the investor's stock
on Form S-3 (U.S. holding company making a public offering of its stock
in the United States) or Form F-3 (Mexican company making a public
offering of its stock in the United States). The Forms S-3 and F-3 are
much simpler, less time-consuming, and cheaper than the preparation of
a Form S-1 or F-1 registration statement. Generally, an investor group
will receive an unlimited number of short-form rights but are limited as to
when the rights can be exercised.262
(iii) Piggyback Rights
A piggyback registration right is a right that allows the investor to in-
clude his shares in a registration statement that the company is planning
to prepare and file with the SEC (or the Mexican CNBV) on behalf of
itself or other stockholders. That is, the investor has the right to "piggy-
back" on the registration statement of someone else in order to register
his own shares. Generally, an investor group will receive an unlimited
number of piggyback rights, but are subject to a cutback or elimination if
the investor's shares would adversely affect the fund-raising effort.
5. Liquidation
In the event of the company's liquidation, resulting either from its dis-
solution 263 or bankruptcy, 264 private equity investors holding ordinary or
limited voting stock, shall hold only a residual claim against the company
for their contributions. In case of liquidation, holders of limited voting
stock shall have a liquidation preference over the holders of ordinary
stock;265 however, holders of both limited voting and ordinary stock shall
be entitled to receive reimbursement on their contributions only after all
of the company's creditors have been satisfied in full. To compensate for
the lack of flexibility of Mexico's corporate law in designing structures
reducing the risk of equity investors when liquidation takes place, inves-
tors customarily request the issuance of share convertible instruments,
which, in the event of the venture's failure, provide the security of having
a preferred credit against the company rather than a residual claim, as is
262. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 3, at 222.
263. Recall that the stockholders may decide to dissolve and liquidate their company
upon selling all of the company's assets to a third party. See General Law of Busi-
ness Organizations, supra note 58, arts. 229, 234, and subsequent.
264. See Bankruptcy Law (Ley de Concursos Mercantiles), art. 167.
265. See General Law of Business Organizations, supra note 58, art. 113.
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the case of stock, and, at the same time, provide investors with the option
of converting such credit into stock, in the event of the venture's success.
Many investors and observers consider the lack of exits to be the single
most pressing issue regarding private equity investments in Mexico. 266 In
the next couple of years, an important number of funds will try to exit
from their current investments. Their success (or failure) will have a di-
rect influence in determining the conduct of funds in the future and the
level of private equity money that will be invested in Mexico in the fu-
ture. For example, the lack of exit options may cause funds to take only
majority or controlling interests in a company, which would be unfortu-
nate for smaller companies whose size often would not justify the extra
time and resources that a fund would need to spend in taking a majority
position.
III. SHOULD A U.S. HOLDING COMPANY BE USED
TO ATTRACT PRIVATE EQUITY?
An entrepreneur typically operates his Mexican business in the form of
one or more of the corporate structures available under Mexican law
(e.g., sociedad anonima, sociedad de responsibilidad limitada). Investors,
however, might be reluctant to invest directly in a Mexican company be-
cause of the legal, economic, and political risks discussed above. To mini-
mize these risks and attract private equity investment, some
entrepreneurs 267 form U.S. holding companies to own the entrepreneur's
Mexican company. The next sections discuss the advantages and disad-
vantages of forming a U.S. holding company to own the Mexican
company.
A. ADVANTAGES
1. Attract Private Equity
a. U.S. Legal System
An entrepreneur might consider using a U.S. holding company to avail
investors to the security of the U.S. legal system. A U.S. holding com-
pany offers investors and entrepreneurs a wide variety of flexible invest-
ment structures 268 that are well-established under U.S. corporate laws
and battle-tested in U.S. courts. In contrast, the investment structures
that are available to investors and entrepreneurs under Mexican law are
limited and their use in private equity investments is not well established.
Also, minority stockholder rights are stronger in the U.S. than in Mexico.
For example, the ability of a stockholder to sue the U.S. company's direc-
266. See Morrison & Foerster, supra note 3, at 10.
267. Entrepreneurs from throughout the world, most notably from India and Israel, are
forming U.S. holding companies for their business operations in their home coun-
try in order to access U.S. capital and U.S. exit opportunities.
268. Stock options, warrants, restricted stock, voting agreements, stock restriction
agreements, redemption rights, liquidation preferences, dividend rights, anti-dilu-
tion rights, and the like.
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tors for damages that the stockholder suffers as a result of any breach of
the fiduciary duty that each director owes to stockholders under U.S. law
provides investors holding minority positions in U.S. companies with an
enormous amount of security in making investments. Minority stock-
holders do not enjoy such protection in Mexico. In addition, the U.S.
judicial system is relatively efficient and accessible and its judgments gen-
erally are easily enforceable whereas the enforcement of rights in Mexi-
can courts is more unreliable and slow.
b. Exit Opportunities
An investment in a U.S. holding company generally offers an investor
more exit opportunities than an investment in a Mexican company.
These exit opportunities include access to the enormous U.S. capital mar-
kets (for purposes of a public sale), a large pool of potential acquirors
(for purposes of a private sale to third parties), and the ability to sell (or
"put") its stock to the company (or redemption). Exits from a Mexican
company generally are limited to company sales and private sales to
stockholders.
c. Investment Community
The U.S. investment community - investors, entrepreneurs, service
providers, government officials - generally is very experienced and offer
investors and their portfolio companies an enormous amount of support.
In contrast, the Mexican private equity community is relatively undevel-
oped and does not offer investors and entrepreneurs such support. Such
experience and support in the U.S. increases the odds that an entrepre-
neur's business will be successful.
2. Other Types of Capital
A U.S. company generally can access more government financial assis-
tance (e.g., loans and guarantees from the U.S. Small Business Adminis-
tration, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and Export-Import
Bank of the United States) than a Mexican company can. Also, once a
U.S. holding company receives private equity financing, it can often ac-
cess loans from U.S. banks. A small or mid-sized Mexican company has
little access to bank financing even with venture financing. In short, a
private equity investment in a U.S. holding company offers investors and
entrepreneurs more flexibility, security, and other benefits than such an
investment in a Mexican Company.
3. U.S. Visas
An entrepreneur who owns or works in a U.S. holding company may
qualify for a variety of visas allowing the entrepreneur, his family, and
key employees to work and live in the United States. These work visas
include an employment-based immigrant visa (such as a permanent resi-
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dent visa or green card) and various types of non-immigrant visas (such
as the E, H-1B, and L non-immigrant visas).
4. Perception
Some entrepreneurs believe that operating their business from a U.S.
holding company creates a positive perception of the company abroad,
giving the company a competitive advantage. Of course, in some parts of




Structuring and forming a U.S. holding company and all related entities
could initially be costly. For example, designing and forming a tax effi-
cient corporate structure in multiple jurisdictions will generally require
substantial legal and accounting work. It is also possible that the transfer
of stock or assets from Mexico to corporations in other jurisdictions could
subject the entrepreneur and/or the Mexican company to local taxes.
However, the overall tax savings are likely to far outweigh the costs of
implementation and, thus, the transaction costs generally should not be
an impediment to implementing such structure.
Once formed, the administrative costs of operating a company in more
than one country and complying with each country's laws can be substan-
tial. Also, the U.S. is a very litigious society, thereby exposing the U.S.
holding company to possible legal risks and expenses.
Whether an Entrepreneur should incur such costs (and risks) depends
on the size of the enterprise and (perhaps more importantly) its expected
rate of growth.
2. U.S. Taxes
While using a U.S. corporation may be very beneficial to facilitate in-
vestment, it could create untoward tax consequences to the investors be-
cause U.S. corporations are subject to tax on their worldwide income at
combined U.S. federal and state rates, which could be upwards of 40 per-
cent. The shareholders are also subject to a second level of tax when
dividends are distributed to them. If the entrepreneur uses a U.S. holding
company for its non-tax benefits, the entrepreneur should be careful to
minimize the U.S. tax impact of the U.S. holding company on the com-
bined operations and the shareholders. The entrepreneur should also be
cognizant of the possibilities to maximize foreign tax savings as well. The
next section discusses the ability to minimize the impact of U.S. tax in the
case where a U.S. corporation is used as the centralized holding company
as well as some suggestions at maximizing foreign tax savings.
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a. Minimizing the Impact of U.S. Tax
If a U.S. holding company is used to attract venture capital, the forma-
tion of a non-U.S. holding company by the U.S. holding company (in a
low or no tax jurisdiction), which would own the stock of the operating
companies could be advantageous to reduce or, in some cases, eliminate
U.S. and possibly foreign tax. The following is a diagram of what the
overall holding company would generally look like:
This structure should be beneficial in reducing (although not entirely
eliminating) the impact of U.S. tax for two primary reasons. First, it
should allow cash from one operating company to be transferred to an-
other operating company without incidence of U.S. tax. This can be done
by having the operating company pay a dividend to the non-U.S. holding
company which, in turn, would transfer such cash to the operating com-
pany in need of it as a contribution to capital. The diagram below illus-
trates how cash would be moved from one operating entity to another.
dividend
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The non-U.S. holding company would itself be formed in a jurisdiction
with a favorable holding company regime and favorable tax treaties.
Consequently, it should not be taxed on the receipt of any dividends and
there would generally be little, if any, dividend withholding tax on the
payment of such dividends.2 69 The result is that there should be little or
no tax cost of transferring the cash from one operating company to an-
other and the cash would not come within the U.S. taxing jurisdiction. 270
Without the imposition of the non-U.S. holding company, dividends dis-
tributed from an operating company would be received directly by the
U.S. holding company and taxable in the United States. In this case, only
the after-tax proceeds would be available for use by the operating compa-
nies. Dividend withholding taxes could also be incurred upon payment of
the dividend. However, all this may be avoided by using a non-U.S. hold-
ing company as the centralized holding company.
The second primary way that the non-U.S. holding company will help
to avoid the impact of U.S. taxation is with respect to a sale or exit of an
investment in one or more of the underlying operating companies. 271 For
example, if a sale of one of the operating companies is desired, the non-
U.S. holding company would sell the operating company and would not
itself be taxed on the receipt of the cash proceeds since it would be
formed in a no tax jurisdiction. This should, if managed properly, gener-
ally allow for investment of the sale proceeds outside of the United States
without the imposition of U.S. tax. Without the non-U.S. holding com-
pany as the centralized holding company, the U.S. parent company would
have to facilitate the sale of the operating companies and would therefore
be taxed on the profit. In this case, only the after tax proceeds would be
available for investment outside the United States.
If cash is distributed from the non-U.S. holding company to the U.S.
holding company, the proceeds would be taxable in the hands of the U.S.
company. However, venture capital investors typically will not allow for
the payment of dividends; thus, this is not likely to be a significant tax
cost of using the U.S. company. There could be tax costs on exit if exit
strategies are not managed properly. For example, if a buyer were to
purchase the entire enterprise by purchasing the foreign holding company
or the operating companies (but not the U.S. holding company) U.S. tax
would be incurred on such sale. On the other hand, U.S. tax could gener-
ally be avoided if the buyer were to buy the shares of the U.S. holding
company because gain from the sale of stock is generally not taxable in
269. The non-U.S. holding company would be formed in a jurisdiction with favorable
income tax treaties so that dividend withholding taxes would be minimized. If
necessary, intermediary holding companies can be used to reduce such tax.
270. Special elections will need to be made for each opco to treat them as flow through
entities from a U.S. tax perspective to avoid the U.S. anti-deferral rules.
271. Here again, having the elections (noted above) in place to treat each opco as a
flow-through for U.S. tax purposes is necessary to avoid the U.S. anti-deferral
rules. It is imperative that these elections be made well in advance of a sale of the
underlying companies.
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the United States to non-U.S. persons.2 72 Therefore, it is possible that
any potential tax inefficiencies created by the U.S. holding company
could be avoided or minimized if operations are structured properly and
careful planning is considered upon exit of the enterprise. It is impera-
tive, however, that all these factors be considered when the entrepreneur
is considering using a U.S. holding company.
b. Maximizing Foreign Tax Savings
What should be considered also in the formation and structuring stages
is the ability to reduce the overall effective rate of tax of the operating
companies. This could generally be done regardless of whether a U.S.
holding company is utilized. Because the corporate tax rate in Mexico,
for example, or many other countries where the operating company will
operate and be subject to tax could be very high (the corporate tax rate in
Mexico is approximately 35 percent), it will generally be advantageous to
implement tax savings strategies to reduce this tax rate. This article does
not discuss all available techniques, but rather one very key planning tool
that involves the use of a so-called intangible holding company. If one or
more of the operating companies has valuable intellectual property, it
may be possible to move this intellectual property to an intangible hold-
ing company, which would be formed in a very low taxed jurisdiction.
This would effectively shift a large portion of the profits from the higher
taxed country of operation to the lower taxed intangible holding com-
pany. The intangible holding company would be an addition to the basic
overall holding company structure discussed above. Set forth below is a




Intangible ] pc [poOc
Holdco Oc poOc
Example: Assume that the operating companies have valuable com-
puter software, which they license to end-users/customers. Under the
272. It is possible that the buyer of the shares of the U.S. holding company would be a
lower price for these shares than it would pay for the shares of the non-U.S. hold-
ing company.
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current structure, the operating companies are selling/licensing this
software directly to their customers and are paying tax on the profits at
regular corporate tax rates of upwards of 35 percent. If ownership of the
software were moved to an intangible holding company, the intangible
holding company could license this software directly to the customer and
could receive the profit directly. The intangible holding company would
then pay an arm's length commission to the operating companies for act-
ing as the sales/marketing agent. Thus, only the commission would be
taxable at the higher tax rate in the hands of the operating companies.
Alternatively, the intangible holding company could license the software
to the operating companies which would in turn license it for a higher
price to the customers. In either case, it should be possible to achieve in
many cases a much lower tax rate (10 percent or possibly lower) on a
large portion of the profits which would ultimately be received by the
intangible holding company. In many cases, it may be possible to effec-
tively shift up to 80 percent to 90 percent of the operating profits to the
intangible holding company, but this will depend on the specific transfer
pricing rules in the applicable operating jurisdictions. Another example
where this concept may be feasible is where there is valuable know-how,
franchises, or other intellectual capital that the operating companies need
to produce their product or continue operating. It may also be possible
to transfer ownership of this property to the intangible holding company
and license it to the operating companies for their direct use (e.g., each
operating company would pay an arm's length royalty to the intangible
holding company), thereby shifting a large portion of the profits to the
intangible holding company.
An added planning technique to reduce further the tax rate in the op-
erating jurisdictions would be for the intangible holding company to
make interest bearing loans of its cash to the operating companies. The
operating companies could then deduct the interest expense, thereby re-
ducing the tax rate in the operating companies and moving the cash to the
lower taxed intangible holding company. The profits shifted to the intan-
gible holding company can be moved back to the operating companies by
having the intangible holding company paying dividends to the non-U.S.
holding company, which would, in turn, contribute the cash to the operat-
ing company. This can generally be done without any tax cost as dis-
cussed above.
Keep in mind; however, the appropriate jurisdiction will have to be
used for the intangible holding company so as to take advantage of
favorable tax treaties and the lowest possible tax rates on the profits.
Certain countries may also have stringent transfer pricing rules to con-
sider. The overall holding company structure, although very effective in
allowing for the savings of significant tax dollars, will take the work of
key corporate and tax advisors to implement. Although the basic concept
may work for many multinational corporations, every multinational
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presents a different situation which will have specific tax and corporate
issues to deal with in planning to implement the basic structure.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article provides a description of the current legal framework for
the emerging private equity industry in Mexico. For this industry to con-
tinue to mature, however, the following issues need to be addressed.
(i) Bolsa Mexicana de Valores (BMV). The current problems that
the BMV faces (e.g., being small, thinly traded, and generally
available only to a handful of top-tier industrial conglomerates
and not to unknown companies with relatively short performance
records), do not offer entrepreneurs and investors a viable exit
opportunity for their stock in a Mexican company. Moreover, a
healthy securities market generally promotes more mergers and
acquisitions between companies, since most are done through the
securities market or to position a company for a public offering.
The absence of a healthy public market and an aggressive merg-
ers and acquisitions market deters investors from making private
equity investments in Mexico because it limits the exits that in-
vestors can make. One solution lies not only in amending the
Securities Market Law to solve the current problems but in mak-
ing the BMV more attractive to all issuers and investors ranging
from institutional investors to individuals. Among the most im-
portant legal measures recently adopted is allowing companies to
register their securities in the Securities Section of the National
Securities Registry to carry out private offerings with the same
standards as public offerings.
(ii) Minority Rights. So long as the General Law of Business Orga-
nizations does not provide adequate protection of minority
rights, institutional investors will be deterred from participating
as minority stockholders in new or ongoing ventures. Recent
changes have been introduced to the Securities Market Law to
enhance minority protection in public companies (such as the
right to appoint a member of the board with 10 percent of the
common stock or rights arising from tender offers). Minority
stockholders in Mexican private companies, however, do not en-
joy such protection.
(iii) Flexible Corporate Investment Structures. The General Law of
Business Organizations does not provide or allow a variety of in-
vestment structures, including voting agreements, redemption of
shares by the private issues, issuance of stock options or war-
rants, or advance waiver of preemptive rights. These are effec-
tive tools to align the interests of investors, founders, and
employees and promotes the continuous growth of the private
equity industry. Recent changes, however, have been introduced
to the Securities Market Law allowing the right for listed compa-
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nies to purchase their own shares through the BMV.2 73 Recent
regulations to the General Dispositions Applicable to Securities
Issuers and other Participants in the Securities Market (Disposi-
ciones de Cardcter General Aplicables a las Emisoras de Valores y
a otros Participantes del Mercado de Valores) establish time peri-
ods for notifying authorities about certain types of redemptions
and the amount of redemptions that may be done in a certain
period of time. 274
(iv) Legal Institutions. Weak legal institutions lead to fewer projects
being financed because they deter many investors from making
investments in the first place and increase transaction costs for
those who do make investments. Although the Mexican court
system has often been characterized as slow and cumbersome,
the following events and/or acts have occurred, which are slowly
making legal institutions more reliable and trustworthy: (i) the
transition to democracy in 2000 resulted in an empowering of the
judicial and legislative power, which reflect a better "checks and
balances" of the Mexican republican democratic government;
and (ii) certain legal reforms including (a) the total reform of the
Supreme Court in 1994 that resulted in a reduction from twenty-
one to eleven supreme court justices; and (b) the enactment of
the Transparency and Public Access Information Law in 2002.
(v) Institutional Sources for Private Equity Capital. There is a lack
of domestic institutional sources for private equity capital in
Mexico. Pressure has been growing to reform the current legisla-
tion to allow pension funds to diversify their investments, but
SIEFORES are not yet allowed by law to acquire instruments
that may be converted into private company shares. However,
insurance institutions now are allowed to invest part of their
reserves in private equity funds, SINCAS, as well as trusts de-
signed to increase investment in domestic companies. Private
corporate pension funds are an additional important source of
private equity capital in Mexico
(vi) Governmental Entities as Sources of Private Equity Capital.
NAFIN (Nacional Financiera), BANCOMEXT, and CONACYT
are potential sources or catalysts for private equity financing in
Mexico. Of these three entities, NAFIN has played an important
role in the private equity market in Mexico, financing fourteen of
the twenty-nine SINCAS. NAFIN focuses primarily on estab-
lished companies with proven markets. NAFIN also has played
an important role in promoting the creation of a law specifically
regulating risk investment (i.e., private equity) as well as devel-
273. See Securities Market Law, supra note 131, art. 41 bis-3.
274. See General Dispositions Applicable to Securities Issuers and other Participants in
the Securities Market (Disposiciones de Cardcter General Aplicables a las Emis-
oras de Valores y a otros Participantes del Mercado de Valores), art. 56.
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oping a risk investment market which enhances the moderniza-
tion and competitiveness of Mexican companies.
BANCOMEXT currently no longer is investing in or promoting
private equity investment projects given the minimum success
achieved in their prior projects. CONACYT, despite assuring fu-
ture investments in technology oriented projects, is currently in a
"waiting" period.
(vii) Tax reform. The tax reform has been on the agenda of the last
two administrations, and most certainly it would serve as a
booster for, among others, the private equity industry. In this
area, double taxation for investors at both the fund level and the
target company and lack of transparency constitutes an addi-
tional cost that sometimes delays or inhibits the entrance of
investment..
(viii) Business Culture in Mexico. The closed business culture in Mex-
ico must evolve into a more open playground where investors
and owners are willing to pursue business opportunities with
newcomers outside of their family and close circle of friends.
NAFTA has slowly permeated into the top-end business play-
ground, but private equity investors should never forget that
Mexicans have different customs and values than their U.S., Ca-
nadian, and European counterparts, and recognition of and re-
spect for such differences will allow for better partnership
relationships.
Each of the issues outlined in this conclusion should help the Mexican
private equity industry mature. During this incubation period, domestic
and foreign industry players should take into consideration the benefits
of using a U.S. holding company to carry out their private equity invest-
ments in Mexico. Finally these players must come to terms with the cur-
rent state of the private equity rules. These rules will evolve, but their
evolution will best result by taking into account the size of the Mexican
economy and civil law system and by adopting the investment instru-
ments and features of the U.S. and Canadian common law system, which
integrate well into the Mexican system.
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ABC, S.A. de C.V.
123 Reforma
01234 Mexico D.F., Mexico
Re: Proposed Purchase of Series A Preferred Stock from ABC,
S.A. de C.V.
Dear X:
In connection with the above-referenced transaction and for purposes
of our due diligence review, we request copies of materials concerning
the items described below for ABC, S.A. de C.V. and its subsidiaries (col-
lectively, the "company").
1. Corporate Records and Charter Documents
a. All minutes of directors' and stockholders' meetings, and all writ-
ten consents of directors and stockholders.
b. Certificate of Incorporation, including all amendments thereto,
Certificates of Designation, etc., and Bylaws.
2. Business Plan and Financial Statements
a. All written strategic, marketing, or business plans.
b. Financial statements and footnotes for each fiscal year since
inception, including balance sheet, income statement, and state-
ment of cash flows (whether audited or unaudited).
c. Quarterly financial statements for the last three fiscal years and
for the period since the latest fiscal year-end.
d. Management's operating budget for the last three years and year-
to-date, including variances.
e. All financial projections.
3. Securities Issuances and Agreements Concerning Securities
a. A list of the company's stockholders and option holders.
b. Copies of agreements relating to outstanding options, warrants,
rights (including conversion or preemptive rights), agreements
for the purchase or acquisition of any of the company's securities,
and agreements relating to the company's past stock issuances.
c. Any documents evidencing registration rights for the company's
securities or evidencing any agreements among the company's
stockholders or between the company and its stockholders.
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4. Material Agreements and Operating Information
a. Any agreements, instruments, or proposed transactions to which
the company is a party or by which it is bound which involve
obligations of or payments to the company in excess of $5,000.
b. Contracts with suppliers, distributors, customers, or manufactur-
ers upon which the company's business is or is expected to be
dependent.
c. Any personal property leases.
d. Any agreements concerning the purchase, lease, or sublease of
real property.
e. Any documents evidencing indebtedness for money borrowed,
guaranties, equipment leases, or any similar liabilities incurred by
the company.
f. Any documents evidencing any mortgages, liens, loans, and
encumbrances with respect to the company's property or assets.
g. Any documents evidencing any loans, or advances made by the
company.
h. Any agreements, understandings, or proposed transactions
between the company and any of its officers, directors, employ-
ees, or affiliates, including without limitation, employment agree-
ments.
i. A summary of insurance policies, or certificates of insurance,
with respect to insurance held by the company or of which the
company is a beneficiary.
j. Any employee benefit plans, including, without limitation, stock
option plans, pension plans, and insurance plans.
k. Any judgment, order, writ, or decree by which the company is
bound or to which it or any of its officers or directors is a party.
1. All documents relating to any acquisitions and divestitures, par-
ticularly agreements involving covenants by or in favor of the
company.
m. Import and export licenses.
n. Marketing and sales literature from the past two years through
the present, including brochures, advertisements, and industry
reports in which the company's promotional materials appear or
in which the company is discussed.
o. Press clippings and releases for the last two years.
p. Any agreements with competitors, including, without limitation,
non-competition agreements.
q. Partnership, joint venture, association, research and develop-
ment, and technical cooperation agreements.
5. Information Regarding Intellectual Property
a. List of principal products (including products being developed)
in each line of business, with short descriptions of the products,
their respective prices, and their stage of development.
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b. All documents relating to company procedures for identifying,
harvesting and protecting inventions, including procedures for
determining whether an invention should be patented or remain
a trade secret, for identifying patentable or inventions made by
employees and consultants of the company, for creating and pre-
serving evidence of conception and diligence, for maintaining
inventions confidentially and avoiding public uses and sales prior
to filing, for making foreign filing decisions, and ensuring the
timeliness of patent filings.
c. Any licenses or agreements of any kind with respect to the com-
pany's or others' patent, copyright, trade secret, other proprie-
tary rights, proprietary information, or technology.
d. Issued patents and patent applications, and information regard-
ing any foreign patent filings.
e. All prior art searches, conclusions, reports, and opinions,
whether internal or external, that the company possesses con-
cerning the infringement of third party patents by its products
and the validity of such third party patents.
f. All documents relating to all federal, state, and foreign trade-
mark registrations and pending applications used in or associated
with the business.
g. All documents relating to all agreements dealing with trade-
marks, e.g., consent letters, mutual agreements, licenses, or oppo-
sition settlement agreements, whether the company is licensee or
licensor.
h. All copyright registration records, including title documents and
payment of renewal fees (for older copyrights).
i. All documents relating to any restrictions or limitations on the
use of the copyright portfolio or third party ownership rights.
j. All agreements dealing with trade secrets, e.g., license, secrecy,
or non-analysis, whether the company is licensor or licensee.
k. All claims and legal or administrative actions involving any of the
company's trade secrets.
1. All agreements with any of the Company's employees and for-
mer employees relating to the use of the company's proprietary
information.
m. All value added reseller (VAR), original equipment manufac-
turer (OEM), and other reseller agreements.
6. Information Regarding Disputes and Potential Litigation
a. Any correspondence or documents relating to any pending or
threatened action, suit, proceeding, or investigation, including,
without limitation, those involving the company's employees in
connection with their prior or present employment or use of
technology.
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b. Any correspondence or documents relating to allegations of the
company's infringement of the proprietary rights of others.
c. Any correspondence or documents relating to any labor agree-
ments or actions, union representation, strike, or other labor dis-
pute.
d. Correspondence, memoranda, or notes concerning inquiries from
federal, state or other government tax, environmental, occupa-
tional safety and hazard, or other officials.
7. Audit Information
a. Management letters from auditors concerning internal account-
ing controls in connection with all audits since the company's
inception (including predecessor companies).
b. All letters that have been sent to the company in connection with
all audits since the company's inception (including predecessor
companies).
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